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ABSTRACT 
 
 
LESSOS LEARED FROM TURKEY’S ITERATIOAL MEDIATIO 
EFFORTS I SYRIA- ISRAELI AD PALESTIIA- ISRAELI COFLICTS 
SICE 2002: 
 IMPACT OF IMPARTIALITY OF THE MEDIATOR  
O THE MEDIATIO OUTCOMES 
 
 
Can ÖZCAN 
 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution MA Thesis, 2010 
 
Asst. Prof. Dr. Doğa Ulaş Eralp  
 
 
Keywords: International Mediation, Impartiality, Israeli- Palestinian Conflict, Israel- Syrian 
Conflict, Turkish Foreign Policy  
 
 The thesis aims to explore influence of impartiality of the Turkey’s mediation efforts 
since 2002 in the conflicts of Israel-Syria and Israel-Palestine on the Turkey’s mediation 
outcomes perceived by the disputants which are Israel, Palestine and Syria. This research 
examines the mediation process as a triangular process rather than dyadic by taking every 
disputants’ perception towards the mediator into account.  
 To this aim, comparative case study is used which is Turkey’s mediation efforts in 
Syrian- Israeli and Israeli- Palestinian conflicts since 2002. The research consists of a textual 
analysis and in depth interviews. Most of the data used in this study derived from the official 
declarations of high level policy makers of Turkey, Israel, Palestine and Syria since 2002 as 
well as qualified newspaper accounts and academic writings. In order to complement those 
sources, interviews were conducted with the high level foreign policy makers of Turkey. 
 Based on the research, the findings show that Turkey as a mediator could utilize its 
partiality by establishing a balanced relative bias towards disputants in order to achieve 
successful outcomes. Secondly, the distinction should be made between impartiality in 
 v 
attitude and impartiality in behavior. Accordingly, Turkey’s impartiality in behavior, not 
necessarily impartiality in attitude; has a more positive influence on achieving successful 
outcomes
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ÖZET 
 
2002’DE ĐTĐBARE ĐSRAĐL- SURĐYE VE ĐSRAĐL- FĐLĐSTĐ 
UYUŞMAZLIKLARIDA TÜRKĐYE’Đ ARABULUCULUK GĐRĐŞĐMLERĐDE 
ÖĞREĐLELER: ARABULUCUU TARAFSIZLIĞII ARABULUCULUK 
SOUÇLARIA ETKĐLERĐ  
 
 
Can ÖZCAN 
 
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümlemeleri Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2010 
 
Yardımcı Doçent Doktor Doğa Ulaş Eralp  
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Arabuluculuk, Tarafsızlık, Israil- Filistin Uyuşmazlığı, Israil- 
Suriye Uyuşmazlığı, Türk Dış Politikası  
 
 Bu tez, Türkiye’nin 2002’den itibaren Israil- Suriye ve Đsrail- Filistin 
uyuşmazlıklarındaki arabulucluk rolünde, arabulucunun taraflar acısından algılanan 
tarafsızlığının, basarılı arabulucuk sonucu almaya etkisini bulmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu 
araştırma, arabuluculuk sürecini ikili bir ilişki yerine iki tarafında arabulucu algısını dikkate 
alarak üçlü bir süreç olarak inceleyecektir.  
 Bu doğrultuda, Türkiye’nin Suriye-Đsrail ve Đsrail- Filistin uyuşmazlıklarındaki 
arabuluculuk girişimleri karşılaştırmalı durum analizi methoduyla incelenecektir. Araştırmada 
metin analizi ve kapsamlı mülakat teknikleri kullanılmıştır. Çalışmada kullanılan veriler 
Türkiye, Đsrail, Suriye  ve Filistin politika karar vericilerinin 2002’ den itibaren olan resmi 
açıklamarı, nitelikli gazete metinleri, ve bilimsel makalelerdir. Bu kaynakları desteklemek 
için Türk Dış Politikası karar alıcılarıyla mülakatlar yapılmıştır. 
 vii 
 Araştırmaya göre, Türkiye arabuluculuk girişimlerinde iki taraf içinde dengeli bir 
eğilim gösterebilirse, taraflılığından yararlanarak başarılı sonuçlara ulaşabilir. Đkinci olarak, 
davranışta tarafsızlık ve tutumda tarafsızlık arasındaki fark belirtilmelidir. Bu doğrultuda, 
Türkiye’nin arabuluculuk girişimlerinde davranıştaki tarafsızlığı, tutumundaki tarafsızlık 
gerekli olmaksızın, basarılı sonuçlar almasına olumlu etki göstermiştir.   
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 1 
ITRODUCTIO 
  
 The purpose of this research is to explore the relationship about the influence of 
impartiality of the Turkey’s mediation efforts since 2002 in the conflicts of Israel-Syria and 
Israel-Palestine on the Turkey’s mediation outcomes perceived by Israel, Palestine and Syria.  
 Since Turkey’s AKP (Justice and Development Party) Government came to power in 
2002, international mediation has become one of the main foreign policy tools of the 
government. In the last eight years, Turkey has initiated numerous mediation attempts to 
resolve the deep rooted conflicts in the Middle East region such as between Israel-Syria, 
Israel-Palestine, Pakistan-Afghanistan, Hamas-Fatah and Iran-the USA. Turkey’s active 
involvement to the Middle East as a peace builder, however, brings suspicion especially after 
Turkey’s pro- Palestinian stance in the Israel’s Gaza War against Hamas on December 2008. 
The following verbal spat in 2009’s Davos meeting between Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep 
T. Erdogan and the president of Israel Simon Peres has severely damaged Turkey’s credibility 
as an impartial mediator from the view of Israel and the international community. Therefore, 
the discontent with Turkey’s mediation reveals many questions about the disputants’ 
expectations from a mediator in terms of its strategies and partiality: What makes a mediation 
process successful? What do disputants expect and desire from a mediator who employs 
facilitator/communicator strategies?  What is the role of impartiality to initiate successful 
mediation?  To what extent escalation of the conflict has impact on the mediation process? 
This research has aim to explore the answers of those questions in the context of Turkey’s 
mediation efforts in the conflicts of Israel-Syria and Israel-Palestine.   
 Since 2002 Turkey’s AKP government has adopted a new regional vision which is 
coined as “zero problem” policy with the neighborhoods. The policy embodies the desire to 
have stable and peaceful relations with the neighboring countries in Middle East as well as in, 
Asia, the Balkans and Transcaucasia. To reach this aim, AKP has a mission to institute peace 
in the Middle East which would bring stability and peace not only to the disputed territories 
but also in return will enhance its own security. In this respect, Turkey actively involved as a 
third party to Syrian-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts which have been previously 
attempted to mediate by various actors such as the U.S.A, France, Egypt, Norway, and Saudi 
Arabia. While, some of those mediation efforts had a short term aim such as forcing countries 
to get into direct negotiations, the other mediation attempts had motivation of establishing 
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long lasting peace among the parties. Turkish government involved the process as a facilitator 
in the Syrian- Israeli conflict and hold series of indirect talks among Syrian and Israeli 
officials in 2008. In the Palestinian- Israeli conflict, Turkey has initiated mediation efforts 
many times which has been welcomed and accepted by the disputants.  
 Turkey’s impartiality has been always the key determinant to be a mediator for the 
disputants of both conflicts. However, Turkey’s fair mediator image has been damaged 
severely after its strong criticisms against Israel’s violent attacks to Gaza Strip on December 
2008. Since impartiality is a main source of influence on the disputants for Turkey, the key 
question is how a mediator could utilize its impartiality to achieve successful mediation 
outcomes and what are the ways to sustain its impartiality throughout the process? 
 I use a comparative approach to analyze the research question. Accordingly, the 
relationship between impartiality of the mediator and the outcome of the process are analyzed 
in two cases: Turkey’s mediation attempts in the conflicts of Syrian-Israeli and Israeli-
Palestinian since 2002. In this respect, content and narrative analysis techniques are used to 
reveal the degree of impartiality of Turkey as well as understanding the satisfaction of the 
disputants from the process. Most of the data used in this study are derived from the official 
declarations of high level policy makers of Turkey, Israel, Palestine and Syria since 2002. In 
addition to the main data sources, I analyze the interviews conducted with high level policy 
makers of Turkey in order to complement the information that was obtained via the study of 
official declarations. 
   To analyze the mediator characteristics, international mediation literature focuses on 
three mediator attributes; impartiality, leverage and status. Among those variables, leverage 
and status are more likely used by powerful mediators and the influence of impartiality could 
be less likely affecting the process and outcome. On the other hand, influence of impartiality 
would be more likely perceived by the disputants in least intrusive mediation strategies; 
holding a role of conveying messages, and establishing confidence among the parties.  For 
this reason, as Turkey prefer facilitator role in its mediation efforts, the influence of the 
impartiality become more conspicuous and enable the researcher to analyze the impact of 
impartiality on the outcome.    
 Impartiality, in the international mediation literature is defined as not supporting any 
disputants and the term is associated with both the bias of the mediator holds towards the 
disputants and motives of the mediator to initiate the mediation. Based on this approach, bias 
and motives of the mediator would be determinant factors to find out the impartiality of the 
mediator. Bias is defined as the cultural, economic and strategic closeness of the mediator 
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with the disputants. Therefore, bias of the Turkey would be revealed by focusing on the three 
variables; a) Alliance Ties, b) Economic Relationship, c) Ethnic/ Religious and Cultural Ties. 
Turkey’s relations with the disputants would be analyzed through those variables. Turkey’s 
motives to initiate a mediation in Syrian- Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts is 
operationalized by employing Zartman and Touval’s distinction of motives of mediator as 
defensive vs. expansionist which constitute the expectations of the mediator as a reward from 
the mediation process( Diagram 1). Lastly, disputant’s satisfaction with the outcome is 
associated with the subjective criteria coined by Bercovitch as fairness, efficiency and 
effectiveness. Therefore, any mediation outcome perceived by the disputants as either fair, 
efficient or effective will be regarded as successful mediation process.   
Diagram 1. Impartiality 
  
 To examine how impartiality of the mediator operates for the particular mediation 
strategy requires also including other crucial dimension which is the stage of the conflict the 
mediator intervenes. The impact of impartiality of the mediator on the disputants’ outcome 
perceptions could change as the level of violence escalates. Since this research focuses on the 
perceptions of the disputants about the mediation process, stage of the conflict has a vital role 
on shaping and distorting the disputants’ perceptions of outcome through stereotyping, 
selective perception, projection and perceptual defense.1 Therefore, the changes in the level of 
violence should be elucidated to examine the role of impartiality in the Turkey’s mediation 
process and how it is viewed and perceived by Israel, Syrian and Palestine. Moreover, 
escalation of violence in the conflict between Israel and Palestine in the late 2008 which also 
                                                 
1 Roy Lewicki, Litterer Joseph, Minton John and Saunders David. egotiation. Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin, 1994, 184-
190. 
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affect the peace process in Israel- Syrian conflict, has enabled the researcher to elaborate the 
impact of the stage of the conflict on the disputants’ perceptions towards the mediator and the 
outcome. 
 On the other hand, it can be argued that an exclusive focus on the relation between 
characteristics of mediator perceived by the disputants might limit our understanding of the 
subject matter, as mediation outcomes are influenced by also other factors such as 
characteristics of the dispute and disputants.2 However, I argue that there is more value added 
contribution to examine the characteristics of the mediator since those variables are not fixed 
unlike to nature of the dispute and disputants so that practitioners of international mediation 
can adjust their foreign policies accordingly. The research, therefore, will be able to give more 
useful insights to improve international mediation efforts in foreign policy making, if we 
focus on the impartiality of the mediator on the process.3     
 There are certain reasons to conduct this research mainly derived from the 
undeveloped nature of the international mediation theory. Many unresolved questions remain 
about what makes for successful mediation. One of the most salient of these debates is about 
the impact of the mediator’s impartiality on the mediation process. In addition to that, very 
little work has been done about how a mediator is perceived by the disputants. The question 
of why the disputants involve the process of mediation, and why they accept it, is vital in 
determining how they will view the mediator with respect to his initial role.4 Despite the fact 
that international mediation is conceptualized as a reciprocal process; most of the studies tend 
to present the process as static and one way. Yet mediation often fails when the disputants 
make different assumptions about the process and have different expectations regarding its 
outcome.5 Concerning the drawbacks of the international mediation literature, this research 
examines the mediation process as a triangular process rather than dyadic. The research 
examines mediator’s relations with the conflicting parties as well as taking disputants’ 
perception towards the mediator into account. The research question, therefore, has value 
added contribution to the current literature on the understanding of international mediation in 
a holistic approach.    
 Furthermore, in the literature of international mediation, there is lack of consensus on 
the indicators of success and lack of conceptual definition on the success of third party 
                                                 
2 Burcu Savun, “Information, Bias and Mediation Success,” International Studies Quarterly, 2002, (52), 2. 
3 Ibid., 5. 
4 Oliver Richmond, “Devious Objectives and the Disputants’ View of International Mediation: A Theoretical 
Framework,” Journal of Peace Research, 1998, 35(6) , 707-22.   
5 Jacob Bercovitch, ed, Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation. London: 
Lynne Riener,1996,6. 
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intervention and identifying relevant external contingencies that may influence the outcomes. 
Thus, conducting this research aims to narrow the gap on the understanding of successful 
mediation by taking the disputant’s perceptions about the behavior and attitudes of the 
mediator as a starting point to evaluate the process. Apart from theoretical implications, the 
research has also policy implications by filling a gap in the literature on Turkey’s foreign 
policy particularly on Turkey’s mediator role in the Middle East. The reasons could be 
discussed as firstly, non systematic policy report analyses dominate the literature on initiatives 
of Turkey's mediation in the era of AKP and those are lack of conflict resolution approach to 
the subject matter except a few studies. Secondly, there is no systematic evaluation of 
Turkey’s mediation initiatives in the sense that to what extent Turkey is successful to play that 
role.   
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CHAPTER 1  
 
 
LITERATURE REVĐEW 
 
 
 
  Starting from the end of Cold War, international mediation has gained prominence as 
a conflict resolution mechanism in the foreign policies of states. Both initiation and 
acceptance of mediation have had direct and indirect purposes such as reducing tension, 
reaching an agreement or gaining reputation, time and credit. Since mediation is one of the 
intervention techniques in conflict resolution, there has been enormous literature on mediation 
not only on the international level but also on the inter-personal, inter-group and inter-
communal level.  
 Third parties according to Young6 are actors which become significantly involved in a 
conflict without total identification with either of the parties. According to Sandole7, a third 
party intervention is an attempt to facilitate processes leading to quite different, albeit 
potentially interrelated outcomes. The conflict resolution literature offers a plethora of third 
party activities, organized under different categories such as preventive intervention, crisis 
management, conflict management, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. 
Apart from third part activities, there are various techniques in third party intervention such as 
negotiation, conciliation, arbitration and mediation. Among those techniques, mediation 
particularly on international level, specifically constitutes the main focus area of this thesis.  
1.1. Definition of mediation 
 As mediation literature is a cross disciplinary endeavor, attracting work in psychology, 
political science, international relations and conflict resolution, the diversity of approaches 
has therefore led to variety of definitions of mediation.  
                                                 
6 Oran,Young,  The Intermediaries: Third parties in international crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1967  
7 Daniel Druckman and Sandra, Cheldelin, Fast, L.; and Clements, Kevin (Eds.), Conflict: From Analysis to 
Intervention, London: Continuum, 2003, 49  
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 Mediation is assistance to two or more interacting parties by third parties who usually 
have no authority to impose an outcome.8 In the literature of mediation, so far there are 
certain questions that have been discussed such as how precisely does the context of a conflict 
affect mediation behavior? How do mediators relate to different parties? What kind of 
mediator should intervene in different conflicts? Is the conflict ripe for intervention? What are 
the ideal conflict and party characteristics for success? Is mediation successful because certain 
preconditions were present or because the strategy relevant for these conditions has been 
employed?9 The answers to those questions have an effect on improving the definition of the 
mediation. Among the attempts to conceptualize the mediation,  Young10 develops a more 
specific definition, describing it as an action aimed at reducing the problems of bargaining 
and facilitating the termination of a crisis through the action of an actor not a direct party to 
the crisis, Skjelsbaek,11 on the other hand, emphasizes not only its role in fostering agreement 
between  disputing parties, but also in reducing conflict between them by describing 
mediation as "efforts by third parties to prevent the eruption or escalation of destructive 
conflict behavior and to facilitate a settlement which makes renewed destructive behavior un- 
likely."  Bercovitch12 links mediation and negotiation by defining mediation as an extension 
and continuation of the parties' conflict management efforts. 
 In the field of international relations, however, the longstanding role of third parties 
has only begun to receive frequent attention, with the work by Young13 leading the way to 
further developments.14 The issue of international mediation became an important topic after 
the end of the cold war in the field of international relations due to its refreshed visibility in 
that era.15 International relations defines mediation as a process of conflict management where 
disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group or state, 
                                                 
8 Kenneth Kressel and Dean G. Pruitt, Mediation research. San Francisco: Josey-Bass • Lund, M. (1996). Early 
warning and preventive diplomacy. In C.A. Crocker & F. O, 1989, pp 24. 
9 Jacob Bercovitch, Allison Houston, Why Do They Do It Like This?: An Analysis of the Factors Influencing 
Mediation Behavior in International Conflicts, Journal of Conflict Resolution; 2000, 44; 170 
10 Young, O. R. 1967. The Intermediaries: Third parties in international crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press 
11 Skjelsbaek, Kjell. 1991. “ The UN Secretary- General and the Mediation of International Disputes.” Journal of 
Peace Research 28(1): 104 
12 Bercovitch, Jacob. 2002. “ Introduction: Putting Mediation in Context.” In Studies in International Mediation, 
ed. Jacob Bercovitch. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 3-24.  
13 Oran Young, The Intermediaries: Third parties in international crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.1996 
14  Ronald J. Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution. Syracuse,NY: Syracuse University Press. 1997 
15 Marieke Kleiboer, Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Jun 1996;40,2; p 360-390  
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or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical 
force or invoking authority of law.16  
 International mediation studies mainly focus on how successful conflict management 
can be improved. For this reason scholars have tended to focus their attention on mediation 
outcomes rather than causes of mediation.17 What kind of motives will lead the third party to 
intervene the conflict and the reasons for the disputants to accept the mediation offer is crucial 
to establish the link between the causes of the mediation and achieving successful outcomes. 
Among the variables that affect the success of conflict management; nature of the dispute, the 
parties and their relationships are concerned.18 However, despite an extensive literature on the 
subject, many unresolved questions remain about what makes for successful mediation. One 
of the most salient of these debates is about the impact of the mediator’s impartiality on the 
mediation process.19 In this regard, the focus of the research on the motivation and bias of the 
mediator is a field which is relatively studied less. The research, with the aim of addressing 
the issue, would fill this gap. Accordingly, it is necessary to elaborate the ongoing debate in 
the literature of international mediation on the impartiality of the mediator and its effect on 
process and outcome of the mediation.  
 
1.2. The Role of Impartiality in International Mediation  
  
 Conceptualization of impartiality in mediation literature is still a debated phenomenon 
and there is no achieved compromise. As mediation is very much a matter of influence by 
affecting the disputing parties and their attitudes, perceptions and behaviours about the 
conflict, impartiality is regarded as the main source of the mediator’s influence.  Impartiality, 
in general, refers to lack of preference in favor of one or more parties in conflict.20 Therefore, 
impartiality implies an unbiased stance of the mediator toward the disputants. Rather than 
mediator’s attitudes towards the conflicting parties, the mediator’s stake in the substance of 
issues in the conflict also constitutes impartiality. In international mediation literature, those 
                                                 
16 Jacob Bercovitch, The structure and diversity of mediation in international relations. In Mediation in 
international relations: Multiple approaches to conflict management, edited by Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. 
Rubin, 1-29. New York: St. Martin’s, 1992 
17 Michael J. Greig, “Stepping Into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?” American Journal of Political 
Science, (49),2005, 249-66  
18 Jacob Bercovitch (ed.).  Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation, London, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996 
19 Andrew Kydd, “Which Side are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation.” American Journal of Political 
Science, 47(4): 2003, 597-611.  
20 Christopher Moore, The mediation process. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 1987. 
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stakes and expectations are often discussed within the definition of motives of the mediator. 
Based on these distinctions, it could be argued that the bias and the motives of the mediator 
are the constituents of the generic term “impartiality”.   
 Accordingly, the ongoing debate on bias and the motives of the mediator needs 
clarifications. Bias is defined in terms of having preferences about how two disputants 
distribute the contested resources by allowing personal opinions to influence judgment21. 
Preferences of the mediator are also emphasized due to the fact that mediator is closer to one 
side than the other politically, economically and culturally.22 In this sense, biased mediator 
cares not only for ending the hostilities but also for resolving the dispute in a particular way 
that is commensurate with its interests.23 Political alliance, economic relationship and cultural 
ties are used in this research to analyze the bias of the mediator towards the disputants. Those 
dimensions include not only direct behavioral acts of the states but also the fixed and latent 
factors such as cultural, religious and ethnic affiliations.  
 Since impartiality is in the eye of the beholder, the bias of the mediator towards the 
first disputant vis-à-vis the other disputant should be taken into consideration. At that point 
the conceptual distinction was attempted by Savun between ‘‘absolute’’ and ‘‘relative’’ bias 
which is described as “that the degree of bias a mediator has toward one of the disputants 
depends not only on the relationship between the mediator and the disputant but also on the 
mediator’s relationship with the other disputant.”24  
If we focus only on the direct relationship between a mediator and a 
disputant, what we will be measuring is the absolute bias. Absolute bias 
between state A and state B captures the bias state A holds toward state B 
independently of the former’s relationship with state C. However, I argue 
that it is the relative bias, not the absolute bias, which is more relevant in 
a mediator’s effectiveness. Relative bias represents the degree of closeness 
between two states in relation to a third state; relative bias reflects a 
triangular relationship. Relative bias implies that state A’s bias toward 
state B is not absolute; it depends on the kind of relationship between state 
A and the other disputant, state C. The degree of bias a mediator has 
toward one of the disputants depends not only on the relationship between 
the mediator and the disputant but also on the mediator’s relationship 
with the other disputant.
25 
 
                                                 
21 Burcu Savun, “Information, Bias and Mediation Success,” International Studies Quarterly, (52), 2008, pp 3. 
22 Peter  J Carnevale and Sharon Arad, “Bias, Neutrality and Power in International Mediation.”  In Bercovitch, 
Jacob. Houstan, A (Eds) Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation, 1996, 40-53.  
23Burcu Savun 2008. “Information, Bias and Mediation Success,” International Studies Quarterly, (52), 4. 
24 Ibid., 12. 
25 Ibid., 13 
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 I apply this distinction to analyze the comparative bias of the mediator holds towards 
each disputant. It enables to reveal the disputant who has closer relations with the mediator.   
 The confusion on the impartiality of the mediator is not only limited to the conceptual 
issues, but also the impartiality on the outcome or success of the process. Therefore, the 
question requires close analysis of how impartiality would influence mediation process.    
 Impartiality might actually increase a third party’s ability to bring peace, as impartial 
mediators are accepted by the disputing parties to bring fair outcomes through honest 
mediation process. Mediators are often thought to be more effective if they are unbiased or 
impartial26. Young argues that, “the existence of a meaningful role for a third party will 
depend on the disputant’s perception of the mediator as an impartial.”27A mediator must have 
no personal preference that the dispute be resolved in one way rather than other.28  
 On the other hand, some scholars question the validity of these assumptions.29 Touval 
and Zartman argue that “mediators are seldom indifferent to the terms being negotiated. Even 
when they seek peace in the abstract, they try to avoid terms not in accord with their own 
interests.”30 Kydd31 argues that a mediator needs to be partial toward the receiver of the 
information in order to be able to convey information in a credible way. Kydd32 formally 
shows only information provided by a mediator who shares your policy preferences to some 
extent, is credible. Therefore it could be suggested that impartiality plays a role in mediation, 
and both can add to a mediator’s ability and desire to influence and to the disputant’s 
willingness to be influenced.33  As the influence of impartiality on the outcome is associated 
with credibility of the mediator from the perspective of the disputants, the ongoing debate 
leads us to conclusion that impartiality is essential a matter of perceptions of the parties in 
conflict.34   
                                                 
26 Ronald J. Fisher, “Pacific, Impartial Third-Party Intervention in International Conflict: A Review and 
Analysis.” In Beyond Confrontatiın: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. John A. 
Vasquez, James Turner Johnson, Sanford Jaffe, and Linda Stamato. Ann Arbor: University of Michingan Press, 
1995, 39-59.   
27  Oran Young,. The Intermediaries: Third parties in international crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 1967 
28 Stulberg, Joseph B. 1987. Taking Charge: Managing Conflict. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
29 Touval Saadia, and William Zartman, ‘‘Introduction: Mediation in Theory.’’ In International Mediation in 
Theory and Practice, ed. Saadia Touval and William Zartman. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1985, pp 118 
30 Ibid., 118 
31 Andrew Kydd, ‘‘Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation.’’ American Journal 
of Political Science 47(4): 2003, 597–611. 
32 Ibid., 607 
33 Peter J. Carnevale and Sharon Arad, “Bias, Neutrality and Power in International Mediation.” In Jacob 
Bercovitch,. Houstan, A (Eds) Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation, 1996, pp 40-53. 
34 Saadia Touval, ‘‘Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations.’’ Jerusalem, Journal of 
International Relations 1(1): 1975, pp 51–69. 
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 Based on the debate, perceptions of the disputants on the impartiality of the mediator 
can be taken as an indicator due to the fact that the mediation efforts are mainly initiated by 
the desires and demands of the disputants which necessitate taking their perceptions into 
account. The relationship between the negotiators and the mediator and the rewards and costs 
that emanate from the complete process of mediation, are in part a product of the perceptions 
of the two parties.35 The implication of this is that the perceptions of the three parties as to 
each other’s position and power, aims and relationships, plus the process of mediation, are 
vital determinants not only of the role that the disputants want the mediator to play, but also 
of the success of the process.36 However, mediation studies often neglect to examine the view 
of the disputants and much of the literature tends to present the process as static and one 
way.37 Our understanding of mediation could be enhanced by incorporating disputants’ 
viewpoint into analyses. The impartiality of the mediator could be operationalized better if it 
is argued in relation with the perceptions of the disputants. The issue is discussed in the 
mediation literature as the role of trust disputants holds towards the mediator. Yet 
disagreement prevails as to whether disputants trust to only impartial mediators38 or they 
could work with “partial” ones too.39   Mediators that have strong interests in ending a conflict 
are said to be perceived by the disputants as more committed and thus, more reliable third 
parties. Such mediators are perceived as more motivated and subsequently, more prepared to 
expend the necessary resources to exert their influence on the parties in order to obtain the 
desired results. Yet highly committed mediators may also have very specific solutions in mind 
that do not coincide with the interests of the disputants.40 
 
1.3. Motives of the Mediator 
 While the aim of the thesis is to focus on the role of the motivation and bias of the 
mediator on the disputants’ perceptions, it is essential to draw the distinction between 
motivation and bias of the mediators. As Conceptualization of the bias refers to the 
                                                 
35 James A Wall, Stark B. John,, and Standifer Rhetta L. Mediation:A current review and theory 
development.Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (3): 2001, 370-391. 
36 Oliver Richmond,. “Devious Objectives and the Disputants’ View of International Mediation: A Theoretical 
Framework,” Journal of Peace Research, 35(6),1998, 707-22.   
37 Jacob Bercovitch, Understanding mediation’s role in preventative diplomacy. egotiation Journal 12 (3): 
1996, 241-247 
38 Oran Young,. The Intermediaries: Third parties in international crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 1967 
39 Andrew Kydd, ‘‘Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation.’’ American Journal 
of Political Science 47(4): 2003, 597–611. 
 
40 Thomas Princen, Internmediaries in International Conflict, Princeton University Press, 1992 
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characteristics of the mediator and relationship with the disputants, motivations of the 
mediator could be defined as the possible rewards or achievements the mediator expect from 
the mediation process. These rewards can take variety of forms. As Mitchell points out; 
achieving some form of settlement, reputation or other non-material good regarded as a 
desirable reward.41 Touval and Zartman distinguish between “defensive” and “expansionist” 
motives.42 Defensive e motives may emerge when a conflict between two states threatens a 
mediator’s interest. Partial mediators may also engage in mediation for expansionist motives: 
the desire to extend and increase their resources, influence and power43. Based on debate 
about the conceptual definition of motivation, I use Touval and Zartman’s theoretical 
distinction between defensive and expansionist motives to analyze the aims and expectations 
of the mediator in the case studies. Most of the scholars argue that a mediator’s interests 
should be aligned with the receiver of the advice for the latter to believe the credibility of the 
message. For instance, Kydd asserts that  
only a mediator who shares your policy preferences to some extent 
could be trusted to tell you that your opponent is likely to back down 
even in the absence of a significant concession. Similarly, it could be 
trusted if it informs you that the adversary has high resolve and you 
should therefore give in. Only information provided by a mediator who 
shares your interest is credible.
44
  
 However, the discussion on the influence of motivation in the mediation process is 
largely speculative and limited to shortage of statistical studies in international and other 
arenas of mediation.45 Therefore, the incorporation of the dimension of motivation into 
research question enables to contribute to a contested area in which scholars have argued.   
 In the literature of international mediation, bias and motivation of the mediator are 
also discussed in relation with type of the role the mediator plays. Kydd46 claims that 
information provision, that some scholars have argued properly belongs to “neutral” weak 
mediators rather than powerful, and potentially biased, mediators and a certain degree of bias 
                                                 
41 Christopher, Mitchell, eds. 1988. ew Approaches to International Mediation.NewYork Greenwood.   
42 Saadia Touval,and William Zartman, ‘‘Introduction: Mediation in Theory.’’ In International 
Mediation in Theory and Practice, ed. Saadia Touval and William Zartman. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1985. 
43 Marieke Kleiboer, Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Jun 1996;40,2; p 360-390 
44 Andrew Kydd, ‘‘Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation.’’ American Journal 
of Political Science, 2003, 47(4): 597–611. 
45 Peter J. Carnevale,. Sharon Arad, “Bias, Neutrality and Power in International Mediation.” 1996 In 
Bercovitch, Jacob. Houstan, A (Eds) Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation, 40-53. 
46 Andrew Kydd, ‘‘Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation.’’ American Journal 
of Political Science 47(4): 2003, 597–611. 
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is not only acceptable but is actually necessary for some roles that mediators play. Princen 
also holds the same perspective with Kydd by stating that while impartiality is appropriate for 
the weak mediator, bias is seen as acceptable, perhaps inevitable, for the powerful mediator.47 
Also Touval and Zartman state that “Successful outcomes could be best achieved not when a 
mediator is unbiased but when he possesses resources that either or both parties value.”48 
 The process of the mediation may also require the mediator to play the role of power 
mediation in terms of bringing additional resources to the table; consequently, impartiality 
could be considered subordinate to the possession of leverage.49 Given the wide diversity of 
activities that are considered as mediation, it is theoretically plausible that mediator bias 
might hinder some types of mediation activities while facilitating the success of others.50  
Accordingly, examining the role of bias and motivation of the mediator necessitates focusing 
on the least intrusive strategies rather than playing power mediation. In order to distinguish 
the appropriate roles the mediator can play in which bias and motivation have much more 
value, the one should review the current discussion on the varieties of strategies and behaviors 
that mediator can play.  
 
1.4. Mediation Style 
 
 Scholars of international mediation have established two different typologies of 
mediation strategies. The first typology was constructed by Kressel51 as indicated in the 
following: 1) Reflective Behavior 2) Nondirective behavior 3) Directive Behavior. Reflective 
Strategies are the most category dealing with producing knowledge and information about the 
conflicting parties. Nondirective behavior is more proactive and involves efforts at controlling 
conflict management environment and the resources. Directive Behavior involves strategies 
seeking to manipulate the parties directly into ending the dispute.52  
                                                 
47 Thomas Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1992,18. 
48 Saadia Touval and William Zartman, ‘‘Introduction: Mediation in Theory.’’ In International Mediation in 
Theory and Practice, ed. Saadia Touval and William Zartman. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1985. 
49 Burcu Savun,  “Information, Bias and Mediation Success,” International Studies Quarterly, (52), 2008,  3. 
50 Ibid.,3. 
51 Kenneth Kressel, Labor Mediation: An exploratory survey. Albany, NY: Association of Labor Mediation 
Agencies, 1972. 
52 Ibid., 23 
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 Another common typology, categorizes mediation strategies into three groups: 
communication facilitation strategies, procedural strategies and directive strategies.53 This 
categorization is based on a continuum ranging from the least intrusive to the most intrusive 
mediation styles. Fisher and Keashly54 have developed the contingency model. According to 
that, third party interventions consist of the following: conciliation, consultation, pure 
mediation, power mediation, arbitration and peacekeeping. According to Kriesberg, certain 
third parties are more apt to play one or more of these roles which may be incompatible for a 
specific third party at a specific time55. For example, when a third party agenda is required 
leverage and resources, manipulator/power mediator mode could accomplish it better than the 
weak mediator. On the other hand, helping to arrange an agenda and suggesting options are 
roles more suitable for a formulator type mediator. Providing a safe space and conveying 
information are some of the important roles often best played by a communicator type 
mediator.56 
 The type of a mediator that the disputants look for lies at the heart of the discussion on 
the relation between type of the mediation behavior and disputants’ satisfaction.57 Some 
scholars58 emphasize the mediators’ possession of leverage and resources as something that 
disputants look for in a mediator. Therefore, mediators with relevant ‘moving power’ are 
more capable of putting a settlement in place. On the other hand, some scholars argue that 
communicator/ formulator type of mediators are more effective in facilitating successful 
outcomes strategy.59 Based on the discussion, for the analyzing the role of bias and motivation 
of the mediator, formulator/communicator strategies perfectly fit since the effect of those 
dimensions could be more clearly seen.   
1.5.Outcome of Mediation and Its Evaluation 
  There is lack of clarity and coherence on how to determine the success of mediation, 
since disputants and mediators may have different goals in mind when they enter conflict 
                                                 
53 Jacob Bercovitch, Allison Houston, Why Do They Do It Like This?: An Analysis of the Factors Influencing 
Mediation Behavior in International Conflicts, Journal of Conflict Resolution; 44; 2000, 170. 
54 Ronald J. Fisher, Loraleigh Keashly, A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions: Theoretical and 
Practical Considerations, Bercovitch, J,(eds) 1996, Resolving International Conflict. 
55 Louis Kriesberg, “Mediation and the Transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, 378. 
56 Ibid., 380 
57 Esra Cuhadar, “Turkey as a Third Party in Israeli- Palastenean Conflict: Assessment and Reflections,” 
Perceptions ,2007, pp  6 
58  Jacob Bercovitch, Allison Houston, Why Do They Do It Like This?: An Analysis of the Factors Influencing 
Mediation Behavior in International Conflicts, Journal of Conflict Resolution; 44; 2000, 170 
59 Andrew Kydd, ‘‘Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation.’’ American Journal 
of Political Science 47(4): 2003, 597–611. 
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management. Some may focus on the content of interactions or others on decision making 
processes. The definition of success may also vary with the standpoint of the judge. The 
principles to the conflict, various interested third parties and representatives of international 
and nongovernmental organizations may all have different criteria of success. However, 
assessment of the mediation based on subjective criteria raises certain criticisms which are: 
whose goals are to be taken into account? Given that goals are often vague, implicit, and 
liable to change, which of the stated goals are taken as crucial? Another pitfall of that goal 
based approach is that many settlements have winners and losers, and in such cases the 
winners are likely to consider the settlement more successful than the losers are.60  
 Other than the goal based approach, some scholars accept the extent of change during 
the mediation process as criteria to assess the effectiveness of the mediation. For instance, 
Terris and Maoz argue that mediation could be regarded successful if the process of the 
mediation brings utility of outcome exceeding the utility of continued conflict.61 Or parties 
may benefit from the fact that a mediator act as a guarantor for an agreement and reduce the 
chances of future costly conflicts.62 
 In order to embrace both of the approaches, Bercovitch proposes two broad evaluative 
criteria that are subjective and objective. For subjective criteria, parties' satisfaction, fairness, 
efficiency and effectiveness are the key parameters. For objective criteria, extent of the 
change determines the outcome such as the cessation of violent behavior and opening of 
dialogue are the determinants.63  For Bercovitch, fairness is associated with the equal 
treatment of the mediator to both parties, efficiency is concerned with the time mediation 
takes and the costs to those involved and lastly, effectiveness is considered as the 
implementability and permanence of a settlement.64 Consequently, all those three factors 
determine the satisfaction of the disputants from the outcome. In the thesis, since I am 
interested in examining disputant’s satisfaction with the outcome, I employ Bercovitch’s 
                                                 
60 Paul Stern, and Daniel Druckman, “Evaluating Interventions in History: The Case of International Conflict 
Resolution” in Stern and Druckman (2000) International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War. National 
Research Council, USA.  
61 Terris Lesley and Maoz Zeev,. Rational Mediation: A Theory and A Test. Journal of Peace Research, 
42(5):2005, 563-583 
62 Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kathleen Young,. Victor Asal, David Quinn, Mediating International Crises: Cross-
National and Experimental Perspectives, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 47 No:3,2003, pp 279-301  
63 Jacob Bercovitch, The structure and diversity of mediation in international relations. In Mediation in 
international relations: Multiple approaches to conflict management, edited by Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. 
Rubin, 1-29. New York: St. Martin’s.1992. 
64 Ibid., 23 
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subjective criteria to assess the effectiveness of the mediator. Based on that, the mediation 
process is categorized as successful if it is perceived either fair, efficient or effective.  
 Another dimension in this research is the effect of the stage of the conflict on the 
interaction between motivation/ bias of the mediator and the disputant’s satisfaction with the 
outcome.   
 
1.6. Stage of the Conflict 
 
 Keashly and Fisher suggested, in their “contingency approach,” that the type of third 
party intervention should match the characteristics of the conflict and what is needed for that 
conflict at that particular stage and time.65 The reason behind that was each stage of the 
conflict (i.e. discussion, polarization, segregation, and destruction), requires a different type of 
third party technique. At the discussion stage, escalation of the conflict will just start and it 
will eventually set barriers in the communication between the conflicting parties. Yet, at this 
stage their relationship is still in a good shape. So, a third party could serve best if it facilitates 
communication between the parties and clarifies the substantive issues.66 At the stage of 
polarization, the conditions could cause deterioration of the relations, decrease in the mutual 
trust and construction of negative stereotypes and enemy perceptions. In this stage, rebuilding 
trust and relations should be priority of the mediator which would fit for the procedural type 
of mediators.67 
 At the third stage of conflict escalation- segregation- hostility between the parties 
dominates the situation. The enemy images begin to solidify and parties see each other as a 
threat to their security and existence.68 Keashly and Fisher recommend power mediation 
would fit best to prevent the conflict escalation and to force parties that an agreement rather 
than resorting violence is possible. At this stage, third parties use their leverage on the parties 
through positive and negative inducement. In the last conflict escalation stage, destruction, 
parties could resort to violence and it is argued that the appropriate form of third party 
intervention at this stage is peacekeeping in order to separate the fighting parties and to bring 
the violence under control before moving on to negotiations. Thus, the third party intervention 
is likely to result in failure if undertaken with inappropriate interventions at the wrong conflict 
                                                 
65 Ronald Fisher, Loraleigh Keashly, A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions: Theoretical and 
Practical Considerations, Bercovitch, J,(eds) 1996, Resolving International Conflict 
66 Esra Cuhadar, “Turkey as a Third Party in Israeli- Palastenean Conflict: Assessment and Reflections,” 
Perceptions, 2007, 5. 
67 Ibid., 5 
68 Ibid, 6 
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stage.69 Bercovitch gains empirical support for the hyphothesis that as the number of fatalities 
in a dispute increases, the likelihood that mediation will prove successful suffers a 
corresponding decline. Protracted and intense conflicts should therefore be managed in a 
different way.70 On the other hand, some argue that the greater the intensity of a conflict, the 
higher the likelihood that mediation will be both accepted and successful as a method of 
minimizing losses.71  
                                                 
69 Ronald Fisher, Loraleigh Keashly, A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions: Theoretical and 
Practical Considerations, Bercovitch, J,(eds) 1996, Resolving International Conflict 
 
70 Jacob Bercovitch,  and Lamare James, The Process of International Mediation: An analysis of the determinants 
of successful and unsuccesful outcomes. Austrian Journal of Political Science 28:1993, 290-305.  
71 Oran Young, The Intermediaries: Third parties in international crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1967. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 In this chapter, I present in detail the research methodology used in order to answer the 
research question. First I present the research question, conceptualizations and the 
operationalizations of the terminology and then I explain the comparative case study 
methodologies used.   
 
2.1. Research Design 
The research question I examine is that 
1) What is the influence of impartiality of Turkey’s mediation efforts in Israeli/Syrian 
and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts since 2002 on the outcomes of Turkey’s mediation 
perceived by Israel, Palestine and Syria. 
 In order to examine the research question, this thesis undertake structured-focused 
comparative case study. In the research, I examine two cases which are Turkey’s mediation 
efforts in Syrian- Israeli and Israeli- Palestinian conflicts. In case study, many features of a 
few cases are examined in depth over a duration of times72 and it is useful for the purposes of 
theory development and theory refinement.73  
 The primary focus of the thesis is to examine a little understood issue or phenomenon, 
to develop preliminary ideas and move toward refined research questions by focusing on the 
“what” question.74 This is an exploratory research since the goal here is to develop pertinent 
hypotheses and propositions for further inquiry, The research aims to explore the relationship 
between the dependent variable that is perceptions of the disputants on the mediation outcome 
and the independent variable that is impartiality of the mediator as well as their contingency 
of that relationship on the intensity of the conflict.   
 Accordingly, I shall use structured focused comparative case approach. I choose two 
cases which are international mediation efforts of Turkey in the conflicts of Syria-Israel and 
Israel- Palestine. The comparison is focused because it deals selectively with only certain 
                                                 
72 Lawrence Neuman, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Pearson Education, 
6th ed., 2006, 97  
73 Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design & Methods, 2nd edition, ,Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 1994, 
35-41 
74 Lawrence Neuman, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Pearson Education, 
6th ed., 2006, 97 
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aspects of the case and structured because it employs general question to guide the data 
collection analysis in that case.75 Therefore, while structured nature of a case enables the 
researcher to have systematic comparison of the data derived from the cases, the focused 
nature provides a selective theoretical focus.  
 The comparative case study method I use is the Most Similar System Designs (MSSD) 
in which cases are chosen because they are similar in most of the aspects. The cases differ on 
only one or two independent variables.76  
 In this research, the cases are similar most of the aspects and differ in certain respects. 
The difference of Turkey’s mediation efforts between Israel- Syrian and Israel- Palestinian 
conflicts are related to Turkey’s degree of impartiality to those disputants. While Turkish 
Government, AKP has religious affiliations with the Syria and Palestinian political actors, the 
support of Turkish public opinion in Palestinian cause enhance the bias of the Turkish 
government towards Palestinians more strongly than the Syria. In addition to that, Turkey’ 
motivations to initiate the processes of both cases differ in the sense that Turkey is more 
security oriented in Israel- Syria conflict, but more expansionist oriented in the Palestine-
Israel conflict. The similarities of the cases are, Turkey employ facilitator/communicator 
mediation strategies in both conflicts which take place in the region of Middle East, and 
involved the conflicts in similar time frame. Related to the nature of the dispute, both conflicts 
are deeply rooted and involve strict psychological barriers such as enemy perceptions, 
mistrust and prejudices. Lastly, intensity of the conflict in Palestine- Israel conflict has 
escalated during the mediation process from December 2008 to January 2009, while that 
conflict have also indirect effect on the Israel- Syrian conflict and cause the suspension of the 
negotiations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 Beasly Kaarbo, Kaarbo Juliet and Beasley Ryan, “ A Practical Guide to the Comparative Case Study Method 
in Political Psychology,” Political Psychology (1999), Vol.20, No.2, pp 372.  
76 Daniel Druckman,. Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis, Sage Publications, London, 
2005, 210 
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Table 1. Most Similar Systems Design: Turkey’s Mediation Efforts 
 In Israel- Palestine and Israel- Syria Conflict 
 
 Mediation in Israel- 
Palestine Conflict  
Mediation in Israel- 
Syria Conflict 
Differences Different degree of 
impartiality- ( Different 
degree of bias and 
motivations) 
Different degree of 
impartiality- ( Different 
degree of bias and 
motivations) 
Turkey assumes 
facilitator/ communicator 
mediator role 
Turkey assumes 
facilitator/ communicator 
mediator role 
Initiation of mediation in 
same time frame 
Initiation of mediation in 
same time frame 
Same characteristics in 
terms of nature of the 
conflict- deeply rooted, 
involves strict enemy 
perceptions 
 
Same characteristics in 
terms of nature of the 
conflict- deeply rooted, 
involves strict enemy 
perceptions 
 
Similarities 
Escalation of conflict to 
destructive stage in 2008 
Escalation of conflict to 
destructive stage in 2008 
 
 The next section develops operational measures of mediator’s characteristics, 
disputant’s perceptions of the outcome and the stage of the conflict (intensity of the conflict).  
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2.2. Operationalizations of the Concepts  
 
 Mediator characteristics are defined in the literature in three categories that are 
impartiality, leverage and status.77  As the research focus on communicator/facilitator type of 
mediator, leverage and status are not the prominent attributes; rather impartiality is the core 
attribute to determine the successfully employing facilitator type of mediation.  I focus on the 
impartiality of the Turkey as a mediator. For this aim, bias and motives of the Turkey would 
be the focused variables. 
  In the process of mediation, the interaction between the mediator and the disputants 
are also contingent upon the intensity of the conflict between the disputants. The intensity of 
the conflict are described in the mediation literature in four stages; discussion, polarization, 
segregation, and destruction. Accordingly, impartiality of the mediator would be analyzed in 
relation with the stage of the conflict 
2.2.1 Bias and Motives as the Attributes of Impartiality 
 I define mediator’s impartiality as not supporting any disputants in the mediation 
process. Impartiality has two facets. Bias as a first-facet identifies the closeness of the 
relationship between the mediator and the disputants. Motives of the mediator as the second-
facet reveal whether expected rewards of the mediator are in alignment with the preferences 
of the disputants or not. In order to qualify as an impartial, mediator needs to be in equal 
distance to the disputants and its motives to initiate the mediation needs to be compatible with 
the interests of the disputants.    
2.2.1.1 Bias 
 I define bias in terms of having preferences about how two disputants distribute the 
contested resources by allowing personal opinions to influence the judgment due to its 
political, economic and cultural closeness. Therefore, I start with the assumption that states 
are biased towards states that have similar outlooks and share similar characteristics. Based on 
the conceptual definition, the bias could be operationalized as having a close relationship with 
the disputants.  To create a valid and reliable estimator of bias, I measure the absolute bias 
between a mediator and a disputant based on three dimensions of their relationships:  
 
1) Alliance ties 
2) Economic relationship 
                                                 
77 Marieke Kleiboer, Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Jun 1996;40,2; p 360-390 
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3) Ethnic/ Religious and Cultural ties 
  
 I code the bias of the mediator on three categories as positive dependence, negative 
dependence and neutral which is borrowed by Savun.78” I argue that nature of the relationship 
determine how they perceive each other whether gain by one of them is perceived as a threat 
or an asset by the other state. The more cooperative relationship between two states, the more 
likely a positive dependence flourishes. The more conflictual relationship between two states 
are, the more likely that a negative dependence prevails.  
 Positive dependence implies the structural relationship and continuity of relations 
which is supported by the bilateral agreements. Neutral dependence refers the lack of high or 
low intensity of the relations. The relations, which is not structured via bilateral agreements 
and the changes of relationship which is temporary due to the international conjuncture will 
be codified as neutral too. Negative dependence refers to the low intensity of the relations and 
lack of bilateral agreements between the parties. By examining the types of relationships 
between a disputant and a mediator, we can estimate that how closely a mediator’s 
preferences are aligned with those of a disputant.  
 Focusing only on the direct relationship between a mediator and a disputant reveal the 
absolute bias. However, since mediation process is a triangular process, effective mediation 
requires assessing the relative bias which represents the degree of closeness between two 
states in relation to a third state.   
 After I calculate the absolute bias of the mediator with respect to each of the 
disputants, I create a relative bias score. The relative bias score is based on a comparison 
between the absolute bias score of a mediator with respect to one of the disputants and its bias 
vis-a`-vis the other disputant. In essence, relative bias represents the (dis)similarity between 
two absolute biases. 
 
Relative Bias of a Mediator = (Absolute bias towards State A) – (Absolute Bias towards B) 
 
1) Alliance ties could be defined in terms of having military agreements between the 
mediator and the disputants. The parties can either share strong military agreements or 
neutrality pacts or lacks any type of alliance. Conflict history also affects the quality of the 
alliance ties. It includes number of militarized disputes a disputant and a mediator have been 
involved in against each other. 
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2) Economic Relationship includes the trade links and agreements between the parties which 
could be categorized as the strong economic relationship (positive dependence), limited trade 
(neutral) or having lack of economic relations ( negative dependence).  
3) Ethnic/ Religious and Cultural ties are operationalized as sharing same ethnicity, 
language, religion or sect.  
 
Table 2. Bias of Mediator Towards Disputants 
 Alliance Ties& 
Conflict History 
Economic 
Relationship 
Ethnic/ Religious 
Ties 
Positive 
Dependence 
   
 
eutral 
   
egative 
Dependence 
   
 
 
2.2.1.2 Motives to Initiate the Mediation 
 
 The conceptual definition of mediator’s motives is the possible rewards or 
achievements the mediator will expect from the mediation process. As the motive forces are 
operationalized as either defensive or expansionist, firstly the kind of rewards the mediator 
may gain should be discussed and then I distribute those kinds of rewards based on whether 
they include expansionist or defensive motives. According to Mitchell,79 sources of rewards 
could be related to material, influence support, security and status/reputation.  
For the sources of rewards, Mitchell divided them in 5 categories and described them as  
1- Material rewards, which may include restoration or increase of previous transfers of 
goods and resources between other parties(not necessarily the adversaries) and the 
intermediary, or the denial of goods and resources to others. 
                                                 
79 Christopher Mitchell, “ Motives for Mediation” in C. Mitchell & K. Webb (eds) New Approaches to 
International Mediation. NewYork: Greenwood Press, 1988, p29-51 
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2- Influence rewards, which can include tangible benefits, such as base rights, rights to 
information or of passage, and less tangible goods such as promises of future support, greater 
wishes of the intermediary, a decline in reliance upon a rival of the intermediary and greater 
openness to the goods, information and personnel of the intermediary. In short, greater 
interdepence between the intermediary and the other party 
3- Support rewards, If influence rewards involve an increase in the intermediary's ability to 
have an effect on another party, rewards of increased support involve a benefit that takes the 
form of active help, and approval for the future actions of the intermediary. 
4- Security rewards is the intermediary's ability to eliminate the overt conflict via settlement 
agreement. The achievement of local peace and stability, plus an enhanced perception of 
security, is often a benefit that arises unambiguously from playing the intermediary role  
5- Status or reputational rewards which take place after a successful mediation and bring 
expectation that the intermediaries naturally take up the mediator's role.  
 As I define expansionist motives in terms of gaining rewards which increase the power 
of mediator in the region or expand its influence over the disputants, material, influence and 
support rewards fit in this category. Whereas, defensive motives involves establishing the 
stability in the region which generate the security of all the parties involve in the conflict, 
status/reputation and security rewards would be concerned as defensive motives.  
  
Table 3: Motives to Initiate the Mediation 
 Mediator 
Expansionist Motives 
(material, influence and support rewards) 
 
Defensive Motives 
(status/reputational and security) 
 
         ( Touval, Zartman, 1985)80 
 
 
 
                                                 
80 Saadia Touval and William Zartman, ‘‘Introduction: Mediation in Theory.’’ In International 
Mediation in Theory and Practice, ed. Saadia Touval and William Zartman. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press. 1985 
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2.2.2 Satisfaction of the Disputants from the Outcome 
 
 The concept of the satisfaction from the outcome is operationalized in terms of 
perceiving the outcome as fair, efficient or effective. If the high level officials of the 
disputants refer any of those terms about the mediation process, the disputant is regarded as 
satisfied from the mediation process. Fairness is related with the expression of concern with 
the process. Efficiency can be thought in terms of the time mediation takes and costs to those 
involved. Effectiveness refers to the implementabilty and permanence of a settlement.81 
 
2.2.3 Stage of the Conflict  
 
 Stage of the conflict is divided into four clusters as discussion, polarization, 
segregation, and destruction. Those concepts are operationalized as in the following:82   
1) Discussion: Negotiation which aims to mutual compromise regarding the relationship 
2) Polarization: Misinterpretation of actions with less direct interchange and eventually 
framing the interaction as win-lose game. 
3) Segregation: Using of threat without having any hope of good improvement in the 
relations. 
4) Destruction: Absence of direct communication combined with violent attacks on the 
adversary.  
 The impact of level of violence in the relationship between impartiality of Turkey 
towards the parties and perceived outcomes by the disputants will be elaborated through 
conceptual definitions discussed above. If the disputants resort violence or mobilize their 
armed units to attack the adversary throughout the conflict, the conflict is regarded as in 
destructive stage. If the disputants don’t commit violence but both were in fraught with 
possibility of armed clash, the conflict would be regarded as in segregation stage. When the 
parties get in direct negotiations while having mutual strict problems, it would be categorized 
in either discussion or polarization depends on the problems within the parties.  Accordingly, 
in Israel-Syria and Palestine- Israel conflicts, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead started on 27 
December 2008 was the turning point to label the stage of the conflicts as destructive. The 
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82 Ronald Fisher, Loraleigh Keashly, A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions: Theoretical and 
Practical Considerations, Jacob Bercovitch, (eds) 1996, Resolving International Conflict. 
 
 26 
attacks of Israel began a wave of air strikes on the Gaza Strip with the stated aim of stopping 
rocket fire of Hamas and arms smuggling into the territory of Israel. The war ended on 
January 18 2010, when Israel first declared a unilateral ceasefire, followed by Hamas' 
announcement of ceasefire. The casualties of Gaza War were between 1,166 and 1,417 
Palestinians and 13 Israelis.83 Since Palestine-Israel conflict usually had spill over effect on 
the escalation of the wide Arab-Israel conflict, the relations between Israel and Syria has also 
soured and ended up with the suspension of indirect negotiations. Therefore, The Gaza War 
on December 2008 would be the event, which shifted the conflicts of Israel-Palestine and 
Israel- Syria from the stage of segregation to stage of destruction. Accordingly, the 
relationship between Turkey’s mediation and outcomes of the mediation processes in both 
conflicts will be analyzed in two stages as pre 2009 and post 2009.    
 
2.3. Data Collection 
  
 The research of this thesis is based on two types of sources. The first type is primary 
sources such as archival and official news sources published by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Turkey, Syria, Israel and Palestinian National Authority such as briefings, 
declarations, reports, official publications and press meetings which are publicly available. 
The second type is the secondary sources: academic writings as well as qualified newspaper 
accounts and chronologies. In order to complement those sources, three interviews were 
conducted with the high level policy makers of Turkey. In the interviews, the target group 
includes people who were directly or indirectly involved in the decision making processes. 
2.4. Quality of Research Design  
 While conducting a comparative case study, quality of the research could be achieved 
by establishing reliable and valid measures. Those factors are salient to reach logical set of 
statements. Therefore, in this part, I argue how to deal with issues of reliability, construct 
validity, internal and external validity.     
 To establish construct validity, correct operational measures for the concepts needs to 
be established. As the operational measures have discussed above, I measure Turkey’s 
                                                 
83 IDF Releases Cast Lead Casualty Numbers, The Jerusalem Post, March 26 2009, 
http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1237727552054&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull, 
Retrieved on 22 May 2010.   
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impartiality and the outcomes of the mediation process perceived by Israel, Palestine and 
Syria. For this aim, I barrowed from international mediation literature the concepts of bias and 
motives of the mediator to reveal the impartiality of the mediator. During the data collection I 
aim to look into the impartiality and outcomes from multiple points of views to establish 
triangulation. In this regard, multiple sources of evidences are necessary so that I benefit from 
primary sources such as archival and official news, secondary sources such as newspaper 
accounts, and three interviews to demonstrate that the selected measurements reflect the 
relationship between impartiality of Turkey and the outcomes of the mediation process. 
 In the issue of internal validity, the concern is over making true inferences. Therefore, 
it is more about whether a particular event resulted from certain set of reasons. Using multiple 
sources of evidences and careful data analyses minimize the rival explanations and 
possibilities in the interferences of the relationship between Turkey’s impartiality as a 
mediator and the outcomes perceived by the disputants.  
 The external validity issue deals with the problem of knowing whether a study’s 
findings are generalizable beyond the immediate case study. As the nature of the research 
question brings case specific knowledge rather than generic knowledge, but the findings 
achieved in this research test the already existing theories about the impartiality of the 
mediator. In addition to that the findings help to theory buildings and open the way for the 
future researches to replicate the findings.        
 In order to ensure the reliability of the research, I use multiple data sources to analyze 
the impartiality of the Turkey and the mediation outcomes perceived by the disputants. The 
data set includes official declaration of the high level officials of the disputants and mediator. 
To ensure documentation of the research, I develop case study data set which enables other 
researchers to replicate the findings.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
TURKEY’S MEDIATIO EFFORTS in the ISRAEL-SYRIA COFLICT 
3.1. General Overview of Israel- Syria Conflict 
  Syrian/Israel conflict could be described as a deep-rooted conflict which dates back to 
1948 first Arab-Israel war in 1948. Syria has been one of the Arab countries that engaged in 
armed conflict against Israel since its foundation in 1948. Syria was involved the first Arab-
Israeli War at 1948. Likewise, Syria had mobilized its armed forces against Israel in 1967 
allied with Jordan, Iraqi and Egyptian forces but severely destroyed by Israel in Six Day 
War84. At this war, Israel captures the area known as the Golan Heights from Syria and that 
development changed the content of the peace negotiations dramatically between Israel and 
Syria and negotiations have began to centered on the strategic occupation of the Golan 
Heights, a narrow strip of land that borders the Sea of Galilee and one of Israel's main water 
sources. The territory is home to both Israelis and Druse Arabs, who consider themselves to 
be Syrian nationals85. In 1973, contrary to attempts of Syria to recapture the Golan Heights, 
Israel defended the area and signed an armistice with Syria in 1974. The treaty created a 
narrow demilitarized zone on the territory’s eastern border, patrolled by the U.N. The 
armistice was followed by the annexation of the region by the Israel in 1981 despite the strong 
criticism of the international community. The peace negotiations had began in 1991 at Madrid 
but little progress could be achieved and eventually the negotiations were cut off in 1996 after 
a series of Palestinian suicide bomb attacks in Israel. Today, there is no final agreement 
                                                 
84Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel- Syrian Negotiations 
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between the parties. In addition to that, Israel accused Syria of harboring Hamas and 
Hezbollah which are labeled as terrorist organizations by the US and Israel. Prime Minister of 
Israel Ehud Olmert stated in 2007 about the position of the Israel regarding Syria as in the 
following:  
“that although Israel is interested in peace with Syria, that country 
continues to be part of the axis of evil and a force that encourages terror 
in the entire Middle East. In order to conduct serious and genuine peace 
negotiations, Syria must cease its support of terror, cease its sponsoring of 
the Hamas and Islamic Jihad organizations, refrain from providing 
weapons to Hizbוullah and bringing about the destabilizing of Lebanon, 
cease its support of terror in Iraq, and relinquish the strategic ties it is 
building with the extremist regime in Iran.”
86
 
 
 The indirect negotiations have started between the parties in February 2007 but 
suspended after the resignation of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in September of that 
year. The attack of Israel to Gaza in early 2009 has damaged peace process severely, and 
since then, there hasn’t been any direct or indirect negotiation between the parties. In the light 
of developments throughout the last decade, stage of the conflict was in segregation phase as 
the parties refused to get in direct negotiations and use the military threat as a way of getting 
concessions. However, despite the good intentions in 2007 by getting into indirect 
negotiations, the increase in the intensity of the conflict in Gaza Strip has suspended even 
indirect negotiations and shifts the stage of the conflict into a more destructive phase.  
3.2. Third Party Mediation Attempts in Syrian- Israeli Conflict 
 3.2.1. US Mediation 
 Since Israel-Palestinian conflict has spillover effect in the whole region Middle, most 
of the third party involvements to the Israeli- Syrian conflict have been discussed in relation 
with Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Middle East peace negotiations began in Madrid, on 30 
October 1991 between Syria and Israel and the negotiations was co-sponsored by the USA 
and the USSR. While, main aim of the conference was to address the Israel- Palestinian issue, 
it also expands its agenda by including Syria, Lebanon and Jordan into the agenda of the 
                                                 
86 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel-Syrian Negotiations 
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conference. The framework of objectives in the conference was formulated by the U.S.A and 
the Soviet Union. In fact, despite the extensive efforts of the international community, little 
progress on the main issues of borders and water rights could be achieved and consequently 
the negotiations were suspended after the Palestinian suicide bomb attacks in Israel.    
 Another US mediation attempt was initiated in December 1995 and January 1996 
through the Wye River Conference, focusing on both security and other issues. On December 
1999, President Clinton announced that Prime Minister Barak and President Assad agreed to 
relaunch Israel-Syrian peace negotiations which were halted since January 1996. The talks 
began at a summit meeting with President Clinton in Washington on December 15, with 
Prime Minister Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk a-Shara, followed by a round of 
negotiations held in West Virginia in January 2000. During the negotiations, US mediation is 
highly supported by the Israeli high diplomats as Israeli US ambassador asserts that  
 United States therefore has been not just a co-sponsor, but the third 
partner to these negotiations... the prime minister has encouraged the 
United States to take an even more active role in the negotiations.
87
  
However, likewise the outcomes of the Madrid Conference, Wye River's understandings and 
goals remain un-implemented and didn’t result in any agreement88.  
3.2.2. Turkey’s mediation attempts to Israeli- Syrian conflict 
 Turkey involved Syria-Israel conflict as a third party in February 2007. Before getting 
into details of the process, the transformation of the severe bilateral relations to strategic and 
economic cooperation between Syria and Turkey needs to be elucidated.   
 Turkey has a troubled history with the Syria in the 1990’s and even the situation was 
driven into the brink of war in 1998. The water dispute in Euphrates and Orontes Rivers as 
well as Syrians explicit support to PKK which is declared as terrorist organization by Turkey 
and European Union, are the core reasons for the deterioration of the bilateral relations. The 
tension was eased and opened the way for a gradual improvement in economic and diplomatic 
relations after the expulsion of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 who was based in 
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Syria89. The rapprochement between Turkey and Syria has crystallized with the 1998 Adana 
Agreement and afterwards Turkey’s relation with Syria has considerably improved in the last 
decade. In this time period, the developments in international environment also precipitate the 
improvement of bilateral relations. The US invasion in Iraq in 2003 had impact on the 
impoverishment of the central government in Iraq which enabled Kurdish regional 
government in North Iraq enjoying relatively more autonomy. The situation met with 
suspicion by the Turkish and Syrian policy makers because Kurds’ achievement of more 
autonomy in North Iraq would trigger Kurdish separatism within their countries since those 
countries have also large Kurdish communities. Therefore, the common interest to deal with 
Kurdish separatist after the US invasion in Iraq was another reason for the rapprochement.  
  Today, both states have gone so far as to develop a de facto diplomatic mechanism by 
means of frequent high-level visits.90 For instance, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s visit to 
Ankara in January 2005 was the first trip by a Syrian president to Turkey since Syria gained 
independence in 1946.91 Also both Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul have paid visits to 
Damascus as prime ministers.92  
 The improving bilateral relations between Syria and Turkey along with the military 
and economic cooperation with Israel enable Turkey to play a mediator role in Syrian- Israeli 
conflict. Ankara started brokering indirect Syrian–Israeli negotiations in February 2007. In 
May 2008 these talks were made public and they have intensified93. Israel and Syria held four 
indirect rounds of peace talks with Turkish mediation in 2008, but they were suspended 
following the resignation of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on September 2008. 
Subsequently, the relations between Turkey and Israel have deteriorated after Turkey’s 
criticism against Israeli policies on Palestine and Israeli attacks to Gaza on December 2008. 
Turkey’s pro-Palestinian declarations and policies met with suspicion in some Israeli 
politicians about Turkey's suitability to play an impartial mediator role. The recent 
declarations of high officials of Israel and Syria show that94 Syria welcomes Turkey as a 
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mediator role again in contrast with Israel’s reservation on Turkey’s mediation role. 
Disputants’ different views are also mentioned by Prime Minister of Turkey; "Syria wants 
Turkey's mediation. Israel sometimes gives positive signals on it. However, no formal request 
for mediation had been received from the Israeli government.”95  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
95 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
TURKEY’S MEDIATIO EFFORTS in the ISRAEL-PALESTIE COFLICT 
 
4.1. General Overview of Israel- Palestine Conflict 
  
 On this section I provide a chorological order of the historical background in the 
conflict between 1948 and 2000. Then a synopsis of the conflict from 2000 to 2010 is 
described which is followed by the analysis of the previous and ongoing third party 
involvements in the conflict.   
• 1948-1967: The period is started with the declaration of the State of Israel and the Six-
Day War. Upshots of the events were the inception of the State of Israel, Egypt’s 
control over Gaza Strip and annexation of West Bank by Jordan.  
• 1967-1993: The period between the Six-Day War and the Oslo Accords, in which the 
conflicted parties reside in the areas addressed by the UN Partition Plan that were 
under the control of the State of Israel. 
• 1993-2000: The period between the Oslo Accords and the Second Intifada, in which 
Israel existed alongside the semi-sovereign political autonomy - the Palestinian 
Authority. 
  The conflict between Israel and Palestine is one of the most enduring and explosive of 
all the world's conflicts. It forms part of the wider, and generally earlier, Arab–Israeli conflict 
which has been lasting for more than 60 years. Since it is long lasting and deeply rooted 
conflict, there have been many turning points in the course of the conflict. In fact, despite the 
many pace initiatives,  there was no improvement in the core of the issues such as mutual 
recognition, borders, security, water rights, control of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements and 
legalities concerning refugees.  
 After the second Intifada in 2000, the most promising development was the Israel’s 
unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005, which inadvertently led to 
strengthening of Hamas in the region. Hamas which is recognized as a terrorist organization 
by the Israel and international community took the control of Gaza Strip from Fatah in 2007 
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after the free elections.96 Emergence of Hamas as a political actor creates division within the 
Palestinian sovereignty in which Fatah controls West Bank while Hamas is in charge of Gaza 
Strip. However, that division aroused after the death of longtime PLO leader Yasser Arafat on 
November 2004 and intensified after Hamas won the elections of 2006 in Gaza Strip. 
 After the elections in the Gaza Strip, Israel adopted a dual strategy towards the 
Palestinians, maintaining pressure against Hamas and the extremists while not closing the 
door to dialogue with the moderates among the Palestinians towards a negotiated two-state 
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.97 
 The military operation of Israel against Hamas in the winter of 2008-2009 has severely 
deteriorated bilateral relations, and extensively criticized by the international community. The 
upshot of the war was that between 1,166 and 1,417 Palestinians and 13 Israelis were killed, 
and tens of thousands of people were left homeless.98 
 After Israeli attacked on Gaza led by Hamas, the current controversial issue between 
Israel and Palestine has been on the expansion of Jewish settlement into Israeli-annexed East 
Jerusalem, which Palestinians see as the capital of their would-be state. Despite the criticism 
of the US President on the settlements, Israel announced that1,600 Jewish homes would be 
built to East Jerusalem just as the vice-president, Joe Biden, was visiting Jerusalem on 10 
March 2010.99  
 The indirect negotiations have started between Israel and the Palestinians on May 
2009 but Palestinians pledged that there will be no direct talks unless the building stops 
completely in East Jerusalem as well as the rest of the West Bank.100 
 Concerning the stage of the conflict, the relations between Israel and Palestinians 
could be categorized as segregation until the rise of the conflict in early 2009 which is 
defined as Using of threat without having any hope of good improvement in the relations. 
The attacks in Gaza Strip have led to destructive stage which is referred as the Absence of 
direct communication combined with violent attacks on the adversary.  
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4.2. Third Party Mediation Attempts in Israel- Palestine Conflict   
 4.2.1 US Mediation in Israel- Palestine Conflict 
 
 The most important mediator in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict has been the U.S.A 
despite its traditional military, economic and strategic alliance with Israel. U.S.A has 
extensively involved in the conflict especially during the Clinton era.  
 Oslo Accords were the first direct, face-to-face agreement between the government of 
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1990s. In this process, Norway 
played a prominent role as a facilitator in secret Oslo talks in early 1990s. The Oslo Accords 
set also a framework for the future relations between the two parties by providing the creation 
of a Palestinian National Authority and the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from parts 
of the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Accords were subsequently officially signed at a public 
ceremony in Washington, DC on 13 September 1993, in the presence of PLO chairman 
Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and US President Bill Clinton. However, 
the peace process eventually was halted after assassination of Israeli leader Yitzhak Rabbin in 
1995.  
 On December 1998, The Wye River Memorandum was signed between Israel and the 
PLO( Palestine Liberation Organization) led by Yasser Arafat in a summit held in the White 
House and the negotiations were brokered by the U.S.A. The Camp David negotiations in July 
2000, was also hosted by the U.S.A under Clinton administration.101 In order to overcome the 
deadlock over Jerusalem and the right of return, the US employed all three types of mediator 
roles- manipulator, formulator, and communicator simultaneously.102 However, both Wye 
River's and Camp David’s understandings and goals remain unimplemented and failed to 
reach a final status settlement.  
 The peace process was followed by the rise of II. Intifada in 2000 and caused the 
suspension of the negotiations.  The core of the criticisms of the mediation attempts under 
Clinton Administration was that its stance toward the conflict was not honest due to its one-
sided pressure on the Palestinians and of blaming Arafat publicly as the sole reason of 
failure.103  
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 Despite those criticism to the Clinton era, during the George W. Bush administration, 
the U.S.A hold more pro-Israeli stance in its mediation efforts due to the changing of the 
international context such as 11 September attacks of Al-Qaeda in New York and Washington 
DC and subsequent invasion of the U.S.A to the Afghanistan and Iraq.104 Along with the 
sticking to one sided approach to the conflict, the US also lost its ambition and interest to 
solve the conflict. Change of the position in the U.S.A was crystallized by abolishing the 
special Middle East coordinator position and by dropping the use of the term “peace 
process.”105 
 In the last decade, first attempt of the US as a mediator was in 2002 by presenting a 
plan for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement based on the two-state solution and introduced a 
timeline for the establishment of a Palestinian state.106 In April 2002, the Quartet was formed 
by four states; USA, Russia, EU, and UN establish a “Road Map” in September 2002 with an 
aim to restart the negotiations.  The Road Map was first outlined by U.S. President George W. 
Bush in a speech on June 24, 2002, in which he called for an independent Palestinian state 
living side by side with Israel in peace.107 However, efforts of the Quartet remain limited due 
to the US’s reluctance to push the parties to follow the principles of Road Map.  
 Direct negotiations could not be re-launched until the Annapolis conference that was 
held in the USA, on 26-27 November 2007. The conference took place with the participation 
of 46 countries and a number of international organizations. At Annapolis, a compromise 
between Israel and Palestine was reached by articulating a two-state solution108 and issuing of 
a joint statement from all parties. Despite the participation of Saudi Arabia and Syria, two 
Arab states that do not recognize Israel, the absence of Palestinian faction Hamas increase the 
suspicion on the prospect of the conference. Nevertheless, Annapolis Conference was 
welcomed by the leaders of the participants and consolidated the consent of the international 
community to resolve the conflict.109  
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 In the light of the mediation efforts of the U.S.A in the Bush era, it could be argued 
that the U.S.A employed the strategy of a formulator and communicator by proposing peace 
settlements and bringing the parties into direct negotiations.  
 Obama’s inauguration to the presidency in January 2009, started with the Israeli 
attacks to the Gaza Strip, and followed by the declaration of ceasefire between Israel and 
Hamas. Having the goal of resuming indirect, talks between the two parties in the conflict, 
Obama administration began a series of meetings on May 2009 to bring new momentum to 
the Middle East peace process110, as it is stated by the US Special Envoy for Middle East 
Peace George Mitchell: 
I'm pleased that the Israeli and Palestinian leadership have accepted 
indirect talks. As we've said many times, we hope that these will lead to 
direct negotiations as soon as possible.  We also again encourage the 
parties, and all concerned, to refrain from any statements or actions which 
may inflame tensions or prejudice the outcome of these talks.
111
 
 
 On the other hand, the US incentive to initiate indirect negotiations has been delayed 
due to Israel’s ongoing construction of buildings in East Jerusalem, which is internationally 
regarded as part of Palestinian territory which eventually caused The Palestinians promptly 
called off the talks. Nevertheless, partial freeze of the settlement buildings after the US’s 
strong pressure and criticisms of international community leads to the resumption of indirect 
negotiation with mediation of US Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell on 
May 2010112. 
 
4.2.2.Mediation Attempts by Arab Countries 
  
 Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan are the countries that aim to facilitate the negotiations 
between different stakeholders of the conflict such as among Palestinian factions, between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority as well as between the Palestinian Authority and the US. 
During the last few years Egypt and Jordan mostly took on a communicator role in the 
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conflict113. During the Israeli’s disengagement from Gaza Strip in 2005, Egypt also involved 
the conflict by placing guards in the Gaza- Egypt border. After the Gaza attacks of Israel in 
the winter of 2008-2009, Egypt played a highly active role by engaging round of mediation 
talks among the Palestinians, Israel and international parties concerned for a durable truce in 
the Palestinian enclave. Apart from launching talks with Israelis and Palestinian factions, 
Egyptian leaders had a series of talks with a number of visiting senior officials of the 
European Union (EU), the international Quartet and the United States on the Palestinian issue, 
particularly the Gaza ceasefire.114 Egypt’s efforts were also encouraged by the international 
community, and furthermore, the U.S. President Barack Obama's special envoy to the Middle 
East George Mitchell and International Quartet's envoy to the Middle East Tony Blair also 
visited Cairo for talks with Egyptian leaders on the Gaza ceasefire in order to show their 
support to Egypt’s mediation efforts. 
 Saudi Arabia also has been active in the mediation role by introducing proposal named 
as Arab Peace Initiative which first proposed in 2002 at the Beirut Summit of the Arab 
League, and re-endorsed at the Riyadh Summit in 2007.115 The initiative had an aim to end 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, which supports normalization of the relations between the entire 
Arab region and Israel, in exchange for a complete withdrawal from the occupied territories, 
including East Jerusalem.116 Despite the strong support of Palestinian Administration to the 
Arab Peace Initiative, Israeli state is yet to formulate an official response either positive or 
negative117. In addition to that, Hamas officials also have not been in unity to respond the 
proposal. While some officials give negative responses, some has optimistic stance.118  
 US Administration during the Bush era had certain reservation about the content of the 
plan and eventually did not support the proposal sufficiently.119 However, during the tenure of 
Obama, George Mitchell, the United States special envoy to the Middle East, declared that  
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President Barack Obama's administration intends to incorporate the initiative into its Middle 
East policy.120 
 Apart from peace initiatives to reconcile the disputants in Israel-Palestine conflict, 
Qatar also involve the conflict within the Palestinian fractions. In 2006, Qatar’s Foreign 
Minister shuttled between the Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas, of Fatah, and 
Prime Minister Ismail Haniya, of Hamas. However, Fatah and Hamas leaders could not reach 
any agreement.121   
 In general, based on the mediation efforts of the Arab countries it could be argued that 
the mediating capabilities of the Arab states hardly went beyond suggesting ideas and 
proposals and conveying information between the parties. Despite their lack of leverage over 
the disputants, their efforts are most of time failed.   
4.2.3. Turkey’s Mediation Attempts  
 Turkey with its predominantly Muslim population, throughout its history, maintains its 
good relationship with Israelis and Palestine.  Turkey is not only among the first group of 
countries that recognized the Palestinian State established in exile in 1988, but it is also the 
first country with a Muslim population that recognized the State of Israel in 1949 following its 
foundation.122 “As such Turkey is among one of those rare countries which both the Israelis 
and the Palestinians trust.”123  Turkey has a claim that “as a facilitator in the search for peace, 
remains at equal distance to both parties with regard to the conflict and this is mainly why 
Turkey enjoys the confidence of both Israelis and Palestinians.”124 Turkey has given her full 
support to the efforts for the success of the peace process since 1991 and especially welcomed 
the first and the second Oslo arrangements of 1993 and 1995 that followed the 1991 Madrid 
Conference125. After the outbreak of the second Intifada, Israel and Palestinian Administration 
had different motivations to call Turkey for mediation. While, Israeli government aims to 
convince Palestinians to renounce terrorism, Palestinians demands Turkey’s facilitation to 
convince Israel to turn to direct negotiations and stop resorting violence.   
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 Turkey’s main stance on the conflict could be described in terms of settling the 
conflict through negotiations “on the basis of a vision of two states living side by side within 
secure and recognized borders, and in the framework of the relevant Resolutions of the UN 
Security Council, the principle of land for peace, the Road Map and the Arab Peace 
Initiative.”126 The lack of confidence is the main reason that lies beneath the current crisis 
according declarations of Foreign Ministry of Turkey. Since Turkey set its mediation agenda 
on confidence building, it could be stated that facilitator/ communicator type of meditation is 
the strategy Turkey has employed. Unlike the Arab and the US mediations which use more 
procedural strategies by introducing proposals, Turkey is more likely to play the role of 
facilitating the interactions between the parties.  
 Over the last few years, Ankara has also begun to adopt a more active policy on the 
Palestinian question. Those efforts gave the fruit with the concurrent visits of President of the 
State of Israel Shimon Peres and President of the PNA Mahmoud Abbas as the official 
invitees of President Abdullah Gül. Those visits marked a distinctive meaning since those 
took place prior to the Annapolis Conference. Turkey supported the convention of and the 
political process started by the Annapolis Conference was reached on the “Common 
Understanding” document, the text of which was read by President Bush. Furthermore, 
Turkey gave utmost importance to the establishment of economic infrastructure of the 
Palestine. The most apparent indicator of Turkey’s contribution for this aim was the Ankara 
Forum held in 2005 with the participation of businessman from Turkey which aims establish 
industrial zones in Palestine.  For instance, an office of Turkish International Cooperation and 
Development Agency (TIKA) was opened in Ramallah in May 2005127 and TOBB (the 
Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges) initiated small and medium size 
projects to support the institutional development of Gaza Strip.128 Those initiatives of Turkey 
shows that Turkey’s mediation approach includes not only to facilitate the interaction between 
the conflicting parties but also to transform the region economically which eventually bring 
prosperity and wealth to the region.  
 Despite the Turkey’s efforts to mediate the conflict, there were certain incidents and 
particular attitudes of the AKP Government towards Israel that soured the relations with Israel 
and jeopardize Turkey’s mediator role. Since AKP government came to power in 2002, 
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President Erdogan has been highly critical of Israeli policy in the West Bank and Gaza, 
calling the assassinations of Hamas officials acts of “state terror.”129 The second event which 
caused estrangement between Turkey and Israel was the Turkey’s hosting of the Hamas leader 
Halid Meshal in Ankara who win the parliamentary elections in Gaza Strip in January 2006. 
The meeting was arranged without consulting Washington and Jerusalem and irritated both 
governments, who wanted to isolate Hamas until it met a series of specific conditions, 
including acceptance of Israel’s right to exist.130 The other incident that soured the relations, 
took place after the Israel’s operation against Hamas in Gaza on December 2008. Turkey 
responded to the Israeli attack on Gaza by strongly criticizing the operation.  Even Prime 
Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan denounced the attack as a “crime against 
humanity,” and declared a suspension of talks with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.131 
The tension reach a peak when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey walked off 
the stage after an angry exchange with the Israeli president, Shimon Peres, during a panel 
discussion on Gaza at the World Economic Forum on January 2009 when Secretary General 
Ban Ki-moon of the United Nations and Amr Moussa, the Arab League’s secretary general 
were present132. Even, in that meeting, Prime Minister of Turkey, Erdogan directly accused of 
President of Peres due to the attacks in Gaza by saying “When it comes to killing, you know 
well how to kill” in the discussion  
 The anger and frustration of the Erdogan reflects overwhelming sympathy of the 
Turkish public opinion and politicians towards the cause of Palestinians.133 Furthermore, the 
attitude of Turkey’s Prime Minister could be regarded as the continuity Turkish foreign policy  
which has always been responsive to Israel’s policies and military operations in the 
Palestinian territory as PM Bülent Ecevit described the Israeli attacks on the Jenin refugee 
camp in 2002 as “genocide.”134 These incidents jeopardize communicator/facilitator mediator 
role and has distort the impartial image of Turkey from the perspective of the Israel which is 
utterly crucial to maintain Turkey’s mediator role.    
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
   TURKEY’S IMPARTIALITY AS a MEDIATOR  
 
 
 
 As it is discussed in previous chapters, the impartiality of the mediator is analyzed by 
focusing on the bias and motives of the mediator. As the bias of the mediator is associated 
with three variables; a) economic relations b) alliance ties c) Ethnic, cultural, religious ties, 
firstly, based on those variables I reveal the absolute bias of the mediator holds towards each 
disputant. Subsequently, I compare the absolute bias of the mediator with each other to find 
out the relative bias mediator holds towards the disputants whether it is neutral or in favor of 
one of the disputants.  
 I define mediator’s impartiality as not supporting any disputants in the mediation 
process. Impartiality has two facets. Bias as a first-facet identifies the closeness of the 
relationship between the mediator and the disputants. Motives of the mediator as the second-
facet, reveal whether expected rewards of the mediator are in alignment with the preferences 
of the disputants or not 
 
5.1. BIAS 
 
 I define bias in terms of having preferences about how two disputants distribute the 
contested resources by allowing personal opinions to influence the judgment due to its 
political, economic and cultural closeness. Therefore, the bias of the mediator is analyzed by 
looking into three variables: a) Economic relationship, b) Alliance ties c) Ethnic/ Religious 
and Cultural ties. I expect that if a mediator and a disputant have strong economic, strategic 
and cultural ties, a mediator is likely to benefit from the disputant’s gain from a conflict with 
another state and thus is likely to be biased toward the disputant.  
 
5.1.1. Economic Relations 
 Economic relations implies the trade links and agreements between the parties which 
could be categorized as the strong economic relationship (positive dependence), limited trade 
(neutral) or having lack of economic relations (negative dependence).  
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5.1.1.1  Turkey’s Economic relations with Palestine  
 After the establishment of Palestinian Administration in 1994, despite intensity of the 
international economic aids, the administration still heavily rely on the support from the 
outside resources. For instance, GDP of Palestine grew %5 in average between 2002 and 2005 
which is mostly occurred due to the annual injection of net current transfers (mainly donor 
funds) of about $1.3 billion, or some one third of annual GDP.135 Those international funds 
were suspended after the Hamas election victory in Jan 2006 leading to an unprecedented 
deterioration of the local economy, especially in Gaza.136 For the more accurate analysis, the 
distinction between Gaza Strip and West Bank should be made in terms of economic 
development. Especially the Israeli-imposed crossings closures and fighting between 
HAMAS and Israel during December 2008-January 2009, resulted in the near collapse of 
most of the private sector, extremely high unemployment, and high poverty rates137. Currently 
shortages of many goods are met through the HAMAS-controlled black market tunnel trade 
that flourishes under the Gaza Strip's border with Egypt. In 2009, unemployment rate of the 
Gaza Strip is around % 40 and in additionally %70 of the population is under poverty rate. On 
the other hand, West Bank controlled by Fatah has relatively better economic conditions 
which are also reflected in economic dates. In 2009, West Bank has achieved % 7 growth rate 
and has % 17.7 unemployment rates.138  
 Throughout the peace process, Turkey has motivation to improve the daily lives of the 
Palestinians with the establishment of sustainable socio-economic infrastructure. Within this 
framework, Turkey announced a comprehensive economic and social action plan for Palestine 
in December 2003.139 The economic relations gained ground in 2004 when the Free Trade 
Agreement was signed between Turkey and Palestinian National Authority. Moreover, an 
office of Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) was opened in 
Ramallah in May 2005 in order to initiate small and medium-size projects to support the 
development of Palestine.140 The major action plan adopted by Turkey in 2005, was through 
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the Ankara Forum with the participation of the businessmen from Turkey (Union of Stock 
Markets and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey-TOBB), Israel (Israel Manufacturers’ Union) 
and Palestine (Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Trade).  After the several meetings, the 
Forum reach a final agreement signed by  Turkey’s President Abdullah Gül, President of the 
State of Israel Shimon Peres and the President of the PNA Mahmoud Abbas in November 
2007. Based on the final agreement, the parties agreed on establishment of an Erez industrial 
zone located in Gaza Strip. During the construction, TOBB has taken over the management of 
the Erez industrial zone in order to attract investment in the area that will provide employment 
to hundreds of Palestinians.141 However, Erez Industrial Zone had been suspended due to the 
conditions following the takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas.142 After the Hamas takeover in 
Gaza, the project was moved to Tarqumia in the West Bank.143 The project aims to contribute 
to the Palestinian economy by creating up to 7,000 jobs.     
 Apart from initiating economic projects, Turkey is also one of the danor to the 
Palastine by pledging to fund 150 million USD to Palestine in the following three years 
starting from December 2007.144 Moreover, there are some civil exchange programs and in 
this regard, for instance Turkey brought 750 Palestinian police officers for training in 
Turkey.145 
Table 4. Bilateral Trade Relations between Turkey and Palestine 
                   (1000 USD) 
Years Exports Change Import Change 
2002 4.729 -21,2% 13 -86,7% 
2003 6.489 37,2% 454 3392,3% 
2004 8.900 37,2% 545 20,0% 
2005 9.133 2,6% 304 -44,2% 
2006 21.153 131,6% 500 64,5% 
2007 21.247 0,4% 761 52,2% 
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2008 20.690 -2,6% 428 -43,8% 
            Republic of Turkey Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade146  
 The table indicates that the economic relations between Turkey and Palestine depends 
on the goods and facilities Turkey provides to Palestine and the intensity of the trade has 
significantly increased especially after 2005, the time when Turkey initiated Ankara Forum to 
establish industrial zones and signed a free trade agreement. Concerning the dysfunctional 
economical structures of Palestine due to the armed conflict with Israel, increase the 
importance of Turkey for the well being of Palestine National Authority and daily lives of the 
people. Despite the economic initiatives of Turkey concerning the bilateral free trade 
agreement and establishment of industrial zones, the low intensity of the numerical value in 
import rate between Turkey and Palestine makes the economic relationship one sided. 
economic relationship between Turkey and Palestine, therefore, falls in the neutral category 
since it is mainly based on the Turkey’s exports and its economic initiatives in the 
reconstruction of Palestine.  
5.1.1.2 Turkey’s Economic Relations with Israel  
 Turkey and Israel has engaged in close economic relations since mid-1990s. The amity 
between both countries crystallized with the numerous agreements which form the legal bases 
of bilateral economic relations such as Free Trade (1997), Agreement on Trade, Economic, 
Industrial and Scientific Cooperation (1997), Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investment (1998), Agreement on the Prevention of Double Taxation (1998), 
Cooperation Agreement on Military Industry (1996) and the Cooperation Agreement in 
Agriculture (1999)147. The intense economic relations maintain and reached its peak by 2005, 
Turkey was Israel's largest regional trading partner, importing $900 million in Israeli goods 
and exporting $1.2 billion in goods to Israel.148 In 2007, the trade volume with Israel was 2,7 
billion USD, while total trade volume between Turkey and Israel in 2006 was 2,3 billion 
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USD149.In addition, the volume of civilian exchanges in terms of number of tourists, 
academics, sports and cultural activities has increased during the 2000s150.         
Table 5.  Bilateral Economic Relations between Israel and Turkey     
            (1000 USD) 
Years Export Import 
2002 861.434 544.467 
2003 1.082.998 459.488 
2004 1.315.292 714.143 
2005 1.466.913 804.691 
2006 1.529.158 782.149 
2007 1.658.195 1.081.743 
2008 1.935.243 1.441.760 
                       Republic of Turkey Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade151 
 Based on the figuress of the table, there have been structural economic relations 
between Turkey and Israel as the trade volume increases and develops consistently in every 
year. Moreover, the balance in the value of export and import articulates the mutual 
dependence of the economic relations, eventually leads the relationship to be categorized as 
positive dependence. 
 Compared to Turkey’s economic relations with Palestine, Turkey and Israel has been 
in economic interaction almost 150 times more than the trade volume with Palestine which 
have led the conclusion that Turkey has relatively positive economic dependence in favor of 
Israel.  
5.1.1.3. Turkey’s Economic Relations with Syria  
 Turkey’s frozen relations with Syria have normalized starting from the early 2000s. In 
this recent period, with commercial steps in the forefront, common projects in many fields, 
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including culture, tourism, security, customs, transportation and agriculture, have been 
initiated in parallel with the improvement in political relations between Syria and Turkey152.  
 There have been many bilateral economic agreements signed by the countries such as 
Agreement on Cooperation in Health (2003), Agreement on the Prevention of Double 
Taxation (2004), Agreement on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investment (2004), 
Protocol on Railway Cooperation (2004), Agreement on Air Transportation (2004), Maritime 
Cooperation Agreement (2004), Free Trade Agreement (2007)153. With the Free Trade 
Agreement which entered into force at the beginning of 2007, the trade volume between the 
two countries was expected to increase significantly in the foreseeable future. The recent 
indicators showed that both countries achieved this aim as it could be seen in the change of 
the export and import values between 2007 and 2008. 
Table 6.  Bilateral Economic Relations between Syria and Turkey 
Years Export 
Change (%) 
Import 
Change  
(%) 
2002 266.772 -5,1 506.247 9,2 
2003 410.755 54,0 413.349 -18,4 
2004 394.783 -3,9 357.656 -13,5 
2005 551.627 39,7 272.180 -23,9 
2006 608.140 10,2 187.006 -31,3 
2007 797.766 31,2 376.959 101,6 
2008 1.113.026 39,5 639.212 69,6 
                     Republic of Turkey Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade154 
 Moreover, in late 2009, visa requirements were lifted for free circulation of civilians 
between Turkey and Syria and two sides had signed 51 protocols by March 2010 on trade, 
development and cultural exchanges155. Therefore, despite the poor economic relations with 
Syria in the early years of Turkey’s AKP Government, economic relations reached the peak 
after 2008. Turkey deepens its economic relation with Syria especially afterwards Israel get in 
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fraught with the Muslim countries in the region due to the its attacks in Gaza Strip from 
December 2008 to January 2009. Based on that, I argue that Turkey’s estrangement from 
Israel boosts the intensification of the relations between Turkey and Syria. Therefore, the 
economic relations between Syria and Turkey would be categorized as neutral until 2009 and 
as positive dependence after 2009.  
 Based on the comparison of Turkey’s economic indicators vis-à-vis Israel and Syria, 
the relative dependence of Turkey was economically more close to Israel. On the other hand, 
it is balanced and could be categorized as neutral after the rise of Palestine- Israel conflict in 
2009 which leads to increase of economic developments between Syrian and Turkey.      
 In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict setting, relatively positive dependence between Israel 
and Turkey exists consistently. 
Table 7. Economic Relations of Turkey vis-à-vis Israel, Syria and Palestine 
 Between 2002 and 2010 
 
 Israel- Palestine Israel- Syria 
Israel Palestine Israel Syria 
Until 2009 After 2009 
Absolute 
Dependence Positive 
Dependence 
Neutral 
Dependence 
Positive 
Dependence Neutral 
Dependence 
Positive 
Dependence 
Until 2009 After 2009 Relative 
Dependence 
Positive Dependence with Israel 
Positive 
Dependence with 
Israel 
Neutral Dependence 
with both Parties 
 
5.1.2 Alliance Ties/ Conflict History  
 
 Alliance ties could be defined in terms of having military agreements between the 
mediator and the disputants. The parties can either share strong military agreements or 
neutrality pacts or lacks any type of alliance. Conflict history also affects the quality of the 
alliance ties. It includes number of militarized disputes a disputant and a mediator have been 
involved in against each other. 
5.1.2.1 The Alliance between Turkey and Palestine 
 Turkey established official relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
in 1975 and was recognized the Palestinian State established in exile on 15 November 1988. 
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Turkey has utterly given importance to its relationship with Palestinian National Authority 
which was established in 1996 and the intensity of the relations have crystallized by paying 
various bilateral visits at all levels.156  While examination of the alliance between Turkey and 
Palestine, the distinction should be made between the Hamas based in Gaza Strip and the 
Palestinian National Authority located in West Bank. As Hamas took the control of Gaza 
Strip after the elections in 2006, Fatah remains as the legislative power in West Bank which 
cause a dual structure over the sovereignty of the Palestinian people. The division in the 
representation of Palestinian people has complicated the third party involvements in the 
greater Palestine- Israel conflict. Because international mediation efforts in the interstate level 
creates ambiguity on the counterpart of the Israel due to the political division of Palestinian 
side. 
 Since the division in Palestinian community has come to surface since 2006, Turkey 
initiated mediation between Hamas and Fatah157, Hamas and Israel and Fatah and Israel. In 
fact, Turkey has put much effort to mediate the conflict between Israel and Hamas especially 
after the Gaza attacks in the late 2008 and it was the Hamas which is main rivalry of the Israel 
in the recent years as it is declared by the Foreign Ministry of Israel:  
 After the elections in the Palestinian Authority (January 2006) 
resulting in the establishment of the Hamas-led government, Israel adopted 
a dual strategy towards the Palestinians, maintaining pressure against 
Hamas and the extremists while not closing the door to dialogue with the 
moderates among the Palestinians towards a negotiated two-state solution 
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 
 Therefore, I focus on the alliance between Fatah and Turkey before 2006 elections, 
and then the alliance between Hamas and Turkey is the focused relationship to reveal the 
alliance between Turkey and Palestine.   
 Turkey’s alliance with Hamas has intensified after the invitation of Hamas leader 
Khaled Mishal to Ankara in 2006 which causes serious criticisms from the U.S.A. and Israel 
since Hamas is declared as a terrorist organization and refused to be conducted official 
negotiations by the U.S.A. and Israel. The meeting between the officials of Turkish and 
Hamas took place after the legislative victory of Hamas in Gaza Strip. Turkey’s main 
principle to conduct direct dialogue with Hamas is that the political entity which derives its 
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legitimization from the results of the free elections, is qualified to engage in direct 
negotiations. Accordingly, isolation of Hamas from the international community and imposed 
economic measures in Gaza Strip is interpreted by Turkey as an attempt to weaken the 
democratically elected order158. Turkey’s expectation to include Hamas into political process 
was requesting from Hamas to declare a ceasefire with Israel in exchange for Israel’s lifting 
blockade of Gaza159. However, the leader of Hamas made no announcement of moderation or 
a change in policy while he was in Turkey in 2006, and thus the whole saga served only to 
legitimize Hamas.160 
 Israel’s attacks on Gaza Strip on the December 2008, has also intensified the degree of 
alliance between Turkey and Hamas. Turkey not only responded to the Israeli attack on Gaza 
immediately, strongly criticizing the operation but also in the aftermath of the attacks,161 but 
also AKP government has called on Western countries to "recognize Hamas as the legitimate 
government of the Palestinian people.162 The efforts of Ankara is interpreted by Hamas 
leaders as the sign of close relations with Turkey as it is indicated by the deputy chairman of 
the Hamas; “Turkey stands right in the middle of our problems playing a remarkable role in 
negotiations between Al Fatah and Hamas as well as for rebuilding Gaza. We are negotiating 
about captive Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Ankara has been trying with us to end the war in the 
region. Moreover it is Turkey telling about what we think, our approach regarding the peace 
or our thoughts on resistance to the other countries.”163 Considering the perception of Hamas 
leaders regarding the Turkey’s efforts and the increasing interaction since 2006 between 
Hamas and Turkey, the alliance ties could be categorized as neutral dependence before the 
conflict escalated in 2008. For the time after the Gaza Attacks of the Israel, the alliance 
maintains its neutrality despite the closer relation between Turkey and Hamas compared to the 
time period before the December 2008. The reason is that still there is no structural alliance 
between the parties while having lack of mutual military agreements or pacts.  
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5.1.2.2. Alliance between Israel and Turkey 
 Turkey was among the very first states that recognized Israel on March 1949 and 
upgraded its diplomatic envoy to ambassadorial level in 1992.164 The relations between 
Turkey and Israel have developed in many areas such as political, economic, technological, 
scientific as well as military spheres165. Both countries attach utmost importance to its mutual 
strategic partnership stem from certain reasons. Firstly, from the Israeli point of view, 
international legitimacy and recognition by its neighbors are the priorities of Israeli foreign 
policy which enhance the importance of Turkey’s alliance as a Muslim country with 
international stature.  Due to the numerous enemies of the Israel in the region, maintaining 
full diplomatic ties with Turkey serves tangible interests of Israel166. Secondly, the military 
cooperation has been playing enormously crucial role between Israel and Turkey.  That 
cooperation is also embedded in the military agreements such as defense and cooperation 
agreement signed in 1996 which was boosting security ties dating back to the "Peripheral 
Pact" of the 1950s.167 Base on the agreement, several Israeli fighter planes train at the Konya 
Airbase in Turkey every year, and both countries conduct joint naval exercises with the 
participation of American warships in the Mediterranean.168 Moreover, in 2005, Turkey 
purchased three unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems from Israeli companies and 
announced the development of seventeen new joint Turkish-Israeli military projects.169 
 Another reason for the close strategic alliance stem from the fact that Israel lobby 
supports Turkey in the American Congress to battle repeated attempts by American 
Armenians to have the events of 1915 recognized as a genocide. The role of Israeli lobby in 
the US, therefore, enhance the strategic cooperation between Turkey and Israel.  
 On the other hand, despite the structural nature of the alliance, the close relations 
between Israel and Turkey has strained at certain times during the tenure of the AKP 
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Government. The firs major setback was the Turkey’s invitation of Hamas leaders to Ankara. 
The meeting between Hamas leaders and Turkish diplomats was arranged without consulting 
Washington and Jerusalem and irritated both governments who aim to isolate Hamas and 
name it as a terrorist organization. Even if AKP argued that the aim of meeting was to 
convince Hamas on the accepting the Israeli’s right to exist, Turkey’s attempt was highly 
criticized by Israeli officials170 and the relations were severely soured.      
 Israel’s operation against Hamas in Gaza has been another the turning point in the 
Turkish-Israeli relations which reach its lowest points particularly after the verbal spat 
between Israeli President Shimon Peres and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at 
Davos in 2009. 
 The ramifications of the bitter relations were especially seen in the military sphere. 
After the Gaza attacks, Turkey disinvited Israel from Anatolian Eagle, an annual Turkish air 
force exercise that it had held with Israel, NATO, and the United States since the Defense and 
Cooperation Agreement signed in 1996.171 Instead, Turkey announced that military training 
would be conducted with Syria.172 Even if the replacement of Israel with Syria took place 
after the Israel’s Gaza attacks on the December 2008, Turkish officials avoid making this 
connection. Nevertheless, regardless of the aim of the Israel’s withdrawal from the military 
training, those events followed by the ending of the Turkey’s mediator role in the Syrian-
Israeli conflict.173  
 The relations hit the bottom when the nationalist Turkish television soap opera “Valley 
of the Wolves” showed fictional scenes of Israeli agents killing old people and kidnapping 
babies. Further to that, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister made a statement publicly how he 
treat Turkish ambassador in an inappropriate manner by noting how the Turk’s sofa was 
lower than his and not putting Turkish flag on the table. Consequently, the events followed by 
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the Turkey’s threat to withdraw its envoy but agreement is generated by the Israelis public 
apology.174  
 Based on the developments, positive dependence of the alliance ties between Israel 
and Turkey turn to neutral dependence especially after the escalation of the conflict in 2009 
Gaza Strip. 
5.1.2.3. Alliance Between Turkey and Syria  
 During 1990s, Turkey and Syria got through bitter relations and even got very close to 
resort direct violence to each other. The deteriorated relations in that decade were mainly 
triggered by the Syria’s explicit support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the PKK, and its 
violent atrocities against Turkish military units. Syria was demanded to prosecute the 
militants of PKK and to extradite its leader Abdullah Ocalan, in fact developments on this 
issue until 1998 did not took place along the interests of Turkey. On October 1998, Turkish 
President Suleyman Demirel declared that Turkey’s patience for Syria ended and mobilized 
the Turkish troops in the Syrian- Turkish border175. The Turkey’s threat of resorting armed 
violence was responded by Syrian officials with complying with the Turkish demands. 
Subsequently, 1998 176Adana Agreement has been accepted and within this framework, Syria 
has recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization and agreed not to support it as well as 
extraditing its leader Apdullah Ocalan from Syria. Eventually, 1998 Adana Agreement has 
been accepted as the beginning of rapprochement in Syrian- Turkish relations and both parties 
initiate mutual constructive approaches leading to close alliance.   
 Another major event leads to close alliance was the US invasion to Iraq which creates 
common Kurdish threat for the both parties since sizable Kurdish minorities within those 
countries could follow an separatist agenda after Kurds in Northern Iraq getting more 
autonomous administration.177 Both Ankara and Damascus worry that the Iraq war has 
unleashed a serious threat of Kurdish nationalism that both must work together to contain.178 
 Enhanced strategic ties were fruitful especially in 2004 when Syria was being accused 
by the US of the assassination of Refik Hariri of Lebanon. Despite the fact that the US 
demanded Turkey to act along with its side, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer disregarded the 
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US’s implications, and refrained from asking Syria publicly to withdraw her troops from 
Lebanon in order to avoid a disturbance in the Syrian- Turkish relations.179 
 Another major breakthrough in bilateral relations took place as Turkish-Israeli ties 
entered a period of crisis after the Gaza attacks in the late 2008. In April 2009, Turkey and 
Syria engaged first ever joint military exercises and agreed to end visa requirements. In 
addition to that, as Turkey cancelled Israeli participation to the joint military exercises, 
Ankara announced another round of military exercises with Syria which is followed by the 
Syrian Turkish meeting of their Strategic Cooperation Council.180  
 Despite the difficulties in addressing key issues on water regarding the Euphrates, the 
parties managed to surmount those issues to prevent the good will and constructive 
approaches both parties’ shares.181  
 Concerning the continuity of close relations since the last decade, the alliance between 
Turkey and Syria could be categorized as neutral until 2009. However, joint military exercises 
and establishment of Strategic Cooperation Council shift the neutrality to positive dependence 
after 2009.   
Table 8. Alliance Ties of Turkey vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine 
 Between 2002 and 2010 
 
Israel Palestine 
Pre- 2009 Post 2009 Pre- 2009 Post- 2009 
Absolute 
Dependence 
Positive 
Dependence 
Neutral Neutral Neutral 
Pre- 2009 Post- 2009 Relative 
Dependence Positive Dependence with Israel Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
179 “Sezer Suriye’de” Sabah, 13.04.2005, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/04/13/gnd92.html, Retrieved on 21 April 
2010.  
180 Schenker, David,2009. “Syria and Turkey: Walking Arm in Arm Down the Same Road,” Jerasulem Center 
for Public Affairs, Vol 9, No 13, 
http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442&
PID=0&IID=3205&TTL=Syria_and_Turkey:_Walking_Arm_in_Arm_Down_the_Same_Road, retrieved on 20 
April 2010.  
181 Kibaroglu, Mustafa, 07 January 2010. “Turkish- Syrian reapproachement: Key to Peace in the Middle East,” 
Middle East Roundtable, http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=1223, retrieved on 21 April 
2010.     
 55 
Table 9. Alliance Ties of Turkey vis-à-vis Israel and Syria 
 Between 2002 and 2010 
 
Israel Syria 
Pre- 2009 Post 2009 Pre- 2009 Post- 2008 
Absolute Dependence 
Positive 
Dependence 
Neutral Neutral Positive 
Dependence 
Pre- 2009 Post- 2009 Relative Dependence 
Positive Dependence with 
Israel 
Positive Dependence  
with Syria 
 
5.1.3. Ethnic/ Religious Ties 
 
 Turkey is a secular country with a predominantly Muslim population, has been 
locating itself among the Western countries. The traditional approach of Turkey, however, has 
been in transformation since the AKP’s tenure as the government. In order to examine the 
ethnic and religious ties of the Turkey with the conflicting parties, therefore, the identity of 
the Turkey ought to be conceptualized as dynamic term instead of static and fixed. In this 
regard, the elaboration of identity of AKP Government and transformation in Turkish Foreign 
Policy since 2002, is necessary condition to reveal the ethnic and religious ties of Turkey with 
the primary parties of the conflicts.          
 Since the inception of the new Turkish Republic, Turkey pursued Western-oriented 
foreign policy which centered on the promotion of national interests vested in the West. 
Turkey maintained non-involvement and noninterference policy towards the Middle East 
Region in the majority of 20th century.182 On the other hand, this conventional foreign policy 
approach has been experiencing a fundamental transformation after the AKP Government 
came into power by adopting a multi-dimensional foreign policy. This new approach includes 
diversifying foreign policy options and trying to solve problems with its neighbors called 
“zero problem policy183” The core question in this point is that whether that transformation is 
caused by the normalization of foreign policy perspectives or ideological re-configuration, de-
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Westernization, or “Middle Easternization” of Turkish foreign policy which puts Islamic 
values as determinant factor in establish relations with the countries of the Middle East.  
 Even if founders of the party were sympathetic to Islamism and current Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül were previously prominent figures in the 
religious oriented former Welfare Party ( Refah Party), the AKP party and its founders are 
highly critical to that party’s policies and argued that the AKP was no longer Islamist but 
rather conservative democrat, plus, it supported Turkey’s membership in the EU, unlike its 
Islamists predecessors.184  
 Despite, AKP officials claim that they are also pro-European Union, the declarations 
of the high officials and foreign policy attempts during 8 years indicate that AKP Government 
is more enthusiasm to establish more close relations with not only moderate Islamist countries 
but also hardliner Middle East actors such as Hamas, the president of Sudan Omer al-Bashir 
and Syria.  For instance, in a visit to Saudi Arabia, Erdogan gave a statement that cooperation 
with Riyadh was for him just as important as EU membership.185 Another incident was the 
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s criticized visit to Iran in which prime minister gave a statement on 
the Iran’s controversial nuclear program, saying “members of United Nations Security 
Council primarily should take steps towards the disarmament.”186 Moreover, president of 
Sudan, Omer al- Bashir who was convicted of atrocities in Darfur by the International Court 
of Justice, paid visits three times to Turkey during the tenure of AKP Government.187      
 Lastly, there are certain incidents shows the public support in Turkey to the Palestinian 
cause and widespread discontent over the Israel’s policies towards Palestinian people. For 
instance, the mass demonstration organized across the country in protest of Israeli’s Gaza 
attack and spectacular welcome-home ceremony that the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
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Erdogan received after the verbal spat with Israeli President Shimon Peres during a panel at 
the World Economic Forum in Davos, were the significant examples of the public opinion188.  
 Taking the changing nature of the identity of Turkish foreign policy since AKP 
Government came into power into account, ethnic and cultural ties of the Turkey with Syria 
and Palestinians could be categorized under positive dependence. On the other hand, neutral 
nature of the ethnic and cultural ties between Turkey and Israel turns into negative 
dependence after the Israeli attack on Gaza Strip in 2009. Therefore, Turkey’s relative 
dependence with the disputants of Israel- Palestine conflict is more close to Palestine. In 
addition to that, in Israel-Syria conflict, Turkey holds a position in favor of Syrians. The 
relative dependence between Turkey and its counterparts Syria and Palestine have been even 
consolidated after the rise of violence in Gaza Strip after 2009.  
 
Table 10. Ethnic and Religious Ties of Turkey vis-à-vis Israel, Syria and Palestine 
 Between 2002 and 2010 
 
 Israel- Palestine Israel- Syria 
Israel Palestine Syria  Israel  
Pre- 
2009 
Post- 2009 Pre- 
2009 
Post- 2009 
Absolute 
Dependence 
Neutral Negative 
Dependence 
Positive 
Dependence 
Positive 
Dependence 
Neutral Negative 
Dependence 
Pre- 2009 Post- 2009 Pre- 2009 Post- 2009 Relative 
Dependence Positive 
Dependence with 
Palestine 
Positive 
Dependence 
with Palestine 
Positive 
Dependence with 
Syria 
Positive 
Dependence with 
Syria  
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5.1.4. General Overview of the Bias Turkey holds towards the Disputants 
   
Table 11. Turkey’s bias towards Disputants in Israel- Palestine Conflict 
 Until 2009 After 2009 
Economic Relations Positive Dependence with 
Israel 
Positive Dependence with 
Israel 
Alliance Ties Positive Dependence with 
Israel 
Neutrality 
Ethnic& Cultural Ties Positive Dependence with 
Palestine 
Positive Dependence with 
Palestine 
 
 The table shows that Turkey had relatively positive dependence to Israel in economic 
relations and alliance ties, in fact had relatively positive dependence to Palestine before   
escalation of the conflict in early 2009. The rise in the intensity of the conflict had impact on 
the alliance ties and causes a shift from Israeli dependence to neutrality. 
 
Table 12. Turkey’s bias towards Disputants in Israel- Syria Conflict 
 
 Pre- 2009 Post- 2009 
Economic Relations Positive Dependence with 
Israel 
Neutrality 
Alliance Ties Positive Dependence with 
Israel 
Positive Dependence with 
Syria 
Ethnic& Cultural Ties Positive Dependence with 
Syria 
Positive Dependence with 
Syria 
 
 As the table indicates, escalation of the conflict had great impact on changing 
Turkey’s relative bias towards the disputants. After the Israel’s attacks on Gaza Strip in early 
2009, the relative dependence Turkey holds in alliance ties turns to in favor of Syrians and 
shifts the positive Israeli dependence to neural in economic relations. Also Turkey maintains 
its pro Syrian stance in ethnic and cultural ties after 2009.   
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5.2. Motives of Turkey to Initiate Mediation 
 
 During the AKP Government, Turkish Foreign Policy has been in transformation in 
terms of regional priorities and diversification of the foreign policy tools and strategies 
followed in the international arena. The key Turkish foreign policy actor of the government is 
current Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu since 2009 and was previously chief policy 
adviser to Prime Minister Erdoğan. Turkey has begun to structure its policies on the basis of 
his principles such as proactive foreign policy, zero problem with neighbors and act as a 
peace builder in Middle East Region. The new vision has its roots in heritage of the Ottoman 
Empire and as well as the opportunities and responsibilities of its geo-strategic location. 
 According to him, Turkey should get benefit of this potential to establish peace and 
security in its neighborhoods by taking on a more active and constructive role.189 The ultimate 
aim of this approach is to transform Turkey from a periphery country to central power.190 The 
historical responsibilities inherited from Ottoman Empire and being located in the edge of 
Muslim and the Western World provides Turkey to embark on new foreign policy towards 
Middle East. This approach includes willingness to play a policy maker role in Middle East 
region which makes a shift in Turkey’s long-standing policy of non-intervention in regional 
conflicts of the Middle East Region. 
 Eventually, the proactive peace builder role aimed by Turkey necessitates foreign 
policy tools and strategies, compatible with this new vision. Accordingly, third party mediator 
role has been employed to intervene the conflicts since Turkey has credibility in the Middle 
East region regarding its position of having good relations with the parties of different 
conflicts. 
 
5.2.1.Turkey’s Motives perceived by the disputants in Palestine- Israel Conflict  
  
 The deep rooted conflict between Palestine and Israel has devastating effects not only 
for its own people but also the countries within the region. In addition to that, conflict has a 
spill-over effect on the other regional conflicts and the continuation of the conflict intensifies 
the extremism around the globe.   
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 In the Arab- Israel conflict, Turkey has been actively supporting the peace process and 
offer mediation many times to both sides of the conflict.191 Despite Turkey’s initiatives to 
play a mediator role, both sides haven’t officially declared Turkey as an official mediator. 
Rather, Turkey has been playing this role unofficially by facilitating the unofficial dialogue 
between Hamas and Israel. The reason of this ambiguity is that, official peace negotiations 
have suspended most of the time due to the intensification of the conflict in the last decade. In 
addition to that Israel and the U.S.A classify Hamas as a terrorist organization and avoid 
engaging official negotiations. Turkey has been following a strategy of empowering 
Palestinian side by giving economic aid and reconciling the dual structure of the 
Palestinians.192 This strategy, in fact, is a continuity of Turkey’s traditional support to 
Palestinians throughout the Arab- Israel conflict. Turkey’s officials are also outspoken critic 
of Israel’s use of asymmetric military power against Palestinians and raised those critics to 
international media to get the attention of international community.193 
 Turkey’s foreign policy initiatives as a mediator role in the Israel/ Palestine conflict 
are combination of defensive and expansionist motives. It is obvious that resolution or 
settlement of Palestine- Israel conflict would provide security in the whole region by 
preventing or containing other conflicts of Middle East. Therefore, as Israel- Palestine conflict 
lie at the heart of the problems in the Middle East, Turkey’s motives includes establishing 
security around its borders as well as in the region. Secondly, As current Foreign Minister of 
Turkey Ahmet Davutoglu has argued, Turkey has a great potential of influence in the region 
achieved by the Ottoman Heritage, therefore, international mediation efforts as foreign policy 
tool is used to achieve greater interdependence with the Palestinians and get the support of 
Palestinian fractions by limiting Iran’s influence on them particularly on Hamas. Moreover, 
proactive role of Turkey would enhance reputation of Turkey as a regional peace builder in 
the international realm. Turkey even emphasizes its motivation to play a central role in global 
issues outspokenly in international meetings.194 
 As Turkey’s mediation efforts were welcomed by both disputants before the scalation 
of the conflict on the December 2008, its aim was perceived by Israel to establish the stability 
and security within the region. However, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East 
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especially after the escalation of the conflict in 2009and its overt influence on the Hamas, 
perceived by Israel as expansionist oriented. 
Table 13.Perceived Motives of Turkey Perceived by the 
 Disputants in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
 Pre- 2009 Post- 2009 
Israel Defensive 
 
Expansionist 
 
Palestine Defensive Defensive 
 
 
5.2.2.Turkey’s Motives perceived by the Disputants in Syria- Israel Conflict     
 
 Turkey has a unique position in Middle East which is able to have relations with all 
the parties in equal distance. Although, Turkey and Syria had bitter relations in the last 
decade, today, the level of interaction between both parties stands almost as a model of 
progress for the rest of the region. Turkey got benefit of its close relations with both of the 
parties by being mediator in the indirect negotiations held on May 2008. Turkey facilitates the 
indirect negotiations aiming to initiate direct negotiation between Israel and Syria. Despite the 
efforts of Turkey, the negotiations were suspended just after Israeli attack on Gaza Strip in the 
late 2008-early 2009. Even if both parties would start direct negotiations, achievement of full 
settlement would be highly difficult and long term process. Therefore, Turkey’s mediator role 
provides a peacebuilder status and enhances its reputation in international environment. 
Turkey was perceived by Israel and Syria as security-exporter country which has capacity and 
legitimacy to establish peace and order in the region. The tension between Turkey and Israel 
which came to surface after the war in Gaza brings suspicion in the Israeli side about the 
appropriateness of the Turkey as a mediator in indirect talks between Israel and Syria. 
However, the suspicion caused due to the Turkey’s soured relations with Israel and its pro 
Palestinian stance195 rather than alignment of Turkey’s motives with the Israel’s preferences.     
 As a result, I conclude that Turkey’s mediation efforts were perceived as defensive 
motives such as achieving reputation and status rather than expansionist motives.   
 
                                                 
195 “Netanyahu: Turkey can’t be honest broker in Syrian talks,” Haaretz, 18 October 2009,  
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/netanyahu-turkey-can-t-be-honest-broker-in-syria-talks-1.5940, 
Retrieved on 23 May 2010 
 62 
Table 14. Motives of Turkey Perceived by the Disputants in Israeli-Syria Conflict 
 Pre- 2009 Post- 2009 
Israel Defensive 
 
Defensive 
Syria Defensive 
 
Defensive 
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CHAPTER 6  
 
 
OUTCOMES OF THE MEDIATIO PROCESS  
PERCEIVED BY THE DISPUTATS 
 
 
 
6.1. Syria and Israel’s Perceptions of Turkey’s Mediation Efforts 
 Turkey’s attempts at mediation have grounded starting from 2004 and both parties 
expressed their interest in Turkey’s facilitator role in February 2007. United States and Israel 
were endeavor to introduce Turkey as a mediator due to the Turkey’s leverage and developing 
relations with Syria196. Previously, Syria and Israel avoid from direct negotiations since US- 
brokered peace talks in 1999-2000.  In the indirect negotiations Turkey’s role was to convey 
the messages of both parties to each other. The meetings were announced and started in 
December 2008. In overall, five rounds were held, and both parties express their content for 
getting into indirect negotiations. The goal of the negotiations was to move to next phase 
which was the initiation of direct negotiations in order to achieve long-lasting peace in the 
region. President Bashar al-Assad of Syria said that indirect talks his country has held with 
Israel could move to direct talks and conclude with a peace deal197. The latest round of 
indirect negotiations between the states had been postponed because of internal Israeli 
politics, and that the outcome would depend on who becomes Israel's next prime minister in 
the coming elections there198. Despite the good intentions of both parties from the process and 
their statements on the possibility of the direct negotiations in the near future, however, the 
negotiations were permanently suspended after the Israel’s Operation Cast Lead started 
against Gaza in the late 2008. Turkey’s explicit support to the Palestinians during the 
operations and the verbal spat in the Davos meeting, damage to Turkish image as a mediator 
from the perspective of Israeli high officials. Turkey is even declared as dishonest broker by 
Israeli diplomats due to its close relations with Islamic countries.  Although the structural 
                                                 
196 Allon Bar, Turkish Foreign Policy Survey: Directions and Dilemmas in 2007,” Perceptions, Autumn- Winter 
2006, 37-57 
197 Syrian Leaders Says Direct Talks with Israel are Possible,  New York Times, 22 November 2008. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/22/world/africa/22iht23syria.18872426.html?scp=59&sq=israel,%20turkey,%
20mediator&st=cse  
198 Says Peace Talks have been Postponed as the Israelis Prepare for Elections, ew York Times, September 5, 
2008Syria  
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C00E6D71E31F936A3575AC0A96E9C8B63&sec=&spon=&
pagewanted=1 
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alliance of the both parties is strong enough not to reduce the level of interaction to a 
minimum level, the credibility of Turkey as a mediator is highly reduced.199  
 Following the operation of Israel to Gaza Strip, Hamas and Israel has declared the 
truce and peace process has again come to agenda of the leaders of Middle East. Turkey also 
declared its eagerness and readiness to resume its mediator role in Syrian- Israeli conflict.  
The dissatisfaction of Israeli policy makers from the mediator role of Turkey, was crystallized 
by Israeli’s official preference of French mediation rather than Turkey.200 Despite the fact 
that, various high level officials of Israel has declared that Turkey’s mediation in Syria- Israel 
conflict is nearly impossible,201 Turkey’s mediation is also appreciated and demanded by 
certain political figures of Israel such as Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Trade Minister 
Benyamin Ben Eliezer.”202 The ambiguity of Israel’s stance on the Turkey’s mediation efforts 
is also indicated by the Turkey’s high level policy makers.203 In fact, criticisms made by 
president and prime minister of Israel as well as discontented Israeli public opinion against 
Turkey shows the dissatisfaction of Israel on the mediation process even though there are 
certain positive remarks of some political figures within Israel policy makers.   
  On the other hand, Syria’s stance on the issue was totally different than Israel and has 
insisted on a resumption of the Turkey to its mediator role. The president of Syria Besar Esad, 
has declared many times that Turkey is the only capable mediator in the conflict, and Syria 
will do its best to reach the peace if Turkey would be the mediator.204  In the light of those 
developments, it seems unlikely that Turkey can resume its role with the current Israeli 
government for the time being, although Syria put pressure to resumption of Turkey’s role.  
Therefore, it could be argued that the mediation of Turkey in Israeli-Syrian indirect 
                                                 
199 Gaza War Created Rift Between Israel and Turkey, ew York Times, February 4 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/world/europe/05turkey.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=israel,%20turkey,%20medi
ator&st=cse. Retrieved 1 May 2010  
200 Netanyahu Fransa’yı arabulucu istiyor,  Radikal, 8 December 2009, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetay&ArticleID=968068&Date=26.04.2010&Ca
tegoryID=100, Retrieved on 1 May 2010 
201 “Arabulubu Erdoğan’a Đsrail sıcak bakmıyor,” Radikal, 24 July, 2009,  
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetay&ArticleID=946372&Date=26.04.2010&Ca
tegoryID=100, Retrieved on 1 May 2010.  
202 “Đsrailli Bakan Burnundan Kıl Aldırmıyor,” Radikal, 29 December 2009, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetay&ArticleID=971649&Date=26.04.2010&Ca
tegoryID=100, Retrieved on 1 May 2010.   
203 The interviews conducted with General and Deputy General Middle East Directorate of Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 21 April 2010.  
204 “Esad Türkiye’de ısrarlı,” Radikal, 14 November 2009, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetay&ArticleID=964289&Date=26.04.2010&Ca
tegoryID=100, Retrieved on 1 May 2010.  
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negotiations is initially perceived as successful by Israelis but after the stage of the conflict 
has escalated in 2008, mediation efforts of Turkey has been perceived as unsuccessful 
because of Turkey’s close alliance with Syria which damages its impartiality and credibility. 
On the other hand, Turkey is continuously perceived as a successful mediator by the Syrians 
Table 15. Syria and Israel’s Perceptions of Turkey’s Mediation Efforts 
 Until 2009 After 2009 
Israel Satisfaction 
 
Dissatisfied: Unfair 
Syria Satisfaction 
 
Satisfaction 
 
 
6.2.Palestine and Israel’s Perceptions of Mediation Outcomes   
 
 Israeli government has been welcoming Turkish mediation efforts in the Palestine-
Israel conflict by demanding from Turkey to convince the Palestinians to renounce terrorism 
and stop resorting to violence. However, invitation of Hamas leader to Ankara in 2006 and 
Turkey’s pro-Palestinian stance in the Israeli’s Gaza attacks on December 2008 were viewed 
with suspicion by Israeli officials.205 Due to the fact that Turkey is perceived as a dishonest 
broker by Israelis, the mediation of Egypt is preferred over Turkish efforts by Israel and the 
U.S.A. Egypt fulfilled the mediation efforts during Israel-Hamas conflict in 2009 by 
organizing a summit at the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheik was jointly chaired by French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy and his Egyptian counterpart Hosni Mubarak. The truce between 
the parties was achieved after the summit in which Turkey is refrained from taking a major 
role in the peace process.  
 Despite the discomfort of Israelis from the mediation efforts of Turkey, Palestinians 
appreciate the Turkey as a mediator particularly after Prime Minister of Turkey criticize 
Israeli attacks and bring the issue to the concern of international community. Traditionally, 
Palestine demand Turkey to persuade Israel to conduct direct negotiations, and stop resorting 
violence and military operation to Palestinian territory. Turkey’s approach to the Gaza attacks 
was also welcomed and appreciated by Arab leaders and societies. Public opinion in the Arab 
world has been broadly appreciative of Turkey’s appearance on the regional stage. According 
                                                 
205 Reuters, February 1 2010, “Israel urges Turkey to rethink ties with Hamas,” 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE51010520090201, Retrieved on 04 May 2010. 
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to a recent survey on the perception of Turkey in the Arab world, Turkey should be more 
interested in the Palestine problem but should also play a bigger role in the Arab world206. 
Current disclosure of Hamas leaders shows that Turkey is successful in mediation by raising 
the demands of Hamas from the peace process to the international community and media.207  
Table 16. Palestine and Israel’s Perceptions of Mediation Outcomes 
 Until 2009 After 2009 
Israel Satisfaction 
 
Dissatisfied: Unfair 
Palestine Satisfaction 
 
Satisfaction 
 
 
                                                 
206 Akgün, Mensur., Perçinoğlu, Gökçe., Gündoğar, S. Sabiha., 2009. “Perception of Turkey in the Middle 
East,” Foreign Policy Analysis Series, TESEV Publications, December 
207 Haberturk, 13 April 2010, On Turkey, Middle East and Israeli soldier with Abu Mrzook of Hamas , 
http://www.haberturk.com/general/haber/507696-on-turkey-middle-east-and-israeli-soldier-with-abu-marzook-
of-hamas, Retrieved on 04 May 2010. The interview conducted with Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook who is 
the deputy chairman of Hamas Political Bureau.  
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CHAPTER 7  
 
 
AALYSIS of the FIDIGS 
 
 
 
 The aim of the chapter is to analyze the findings reflected in the previous chapters. In 
this regard, the findings on the bias and motives of the mediator as well as outcomes of the 
mediation process in both conflict cases are clustered individually and analyzed accordingly. 
Then, both clusters are combined together which enable to posit an integrated model for 
analysis.   
7.1. Israel- Palestine Conflict 
 
Table 17. Integrated Findings in Israel- Palestine Conflict 
  Pre- 2009 Post-2009 
Economic Relations Positive Dependence 
with Israel 
Positive Dependence 
with Israel 
Alliance Ties Positive Dependence 
with Israel 
Neutrality 
 
Relative Bias Turkey 
holds towards the 
disputants 
 Ethnic& Religious 
Ties 
Positive Dependence 
with Palestine 
Positive Dependence 
with Palestine 
 
 
Israel 
 
 
 
Defensive 
 
 
 
Expansionist 
 
 
Motives of Turkey 
Perceived by the 
Disputants in 
Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict 
 
 
Palestine 
 
Defensive 
 
 
Defensive 
 
 
Israel 
 
Satisfaction 
 
 
Dissatisfied: Unfair 
 
Palestine and 
Israel’s Perceptions 
of Mediation 
Outcomes 
 
 
Palestine 
 
Satisfaction 
 
 
Satisfaction 
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 As the table indicates, until the eruption of the conflict in Gaza Strip on December 
2008, the disputants perceive the mediation efforts of Turkey as fair, efficient and effective. 
Although, Turkey is biased in favor of Israel in terms of its economic and alliance ties, 
Turkey’s mediation was welcomed by the Palestinians for the fact that Turkey with its Islamic 
roots has positive religious and cultural dependence with Palestinians and could play the role 
of facilitator by gaining trust and confidence of them. Turkey’s perceived balance of partiality 
combined with its defensive motives, have led to expectation for the disputants to involve fair 
mediation process. Until the violence of the conflict intensified, successful outcomes of the 
mediation were mainly derived from the Turkey’s balanced bias towards the disputants which 
doesn’t challenge the asymmetric power relations between Palestine and Israel. As Turkey 
benefit from its geographical position with embracing western values in predominantly 
Muslim population, perfectly fits to the impartial mediator role which aims the sustainability 
of the indirect negotiations between the disputants belongs to different cultures. While Israel 
utilize Turkey’s ethnic and cultural ties with the Palestinians, in return, Turkey’s structural 
relations with Israelis in the sphere of commerce and military were benefited by the 
Palestinians to send their messages via a reputable mediator.   
 Nevertheless, disputants’ perception of fair mediator role for Turkey has changed 
after the conflict passed through destructive stage on December 2008. In this stage, Turkey’s 
positive dependence in alliance ties with Israel has shifted to neutrality which causes Israelis 
to start to perceive the motives of Turkey as an expansionist. As nature of the conflict in Gaza 
Strip in 2009 between Israel and Palestine involves asymmetric power relations, Turkey’s 
attempts to empower Hamas by raising concerns and critics of it to the international 
community, put Turkey’s impartiality in jeopardy. 
 Incorporating the disputant’s view on the motives of the mediator shows that 
mediation outcomes could be perceived divergently and reveals the fact that mediation 
process is a dynamic process that the mediator ought to take every disputants’ view into 
account. So the results on the outcomes of the mediation have value added dimension that 
mediation should not be seen as one way static approach but rather, contingent and reciprocal 
process.   
 Apart from that, the results give insights on the boundaries of communication-
facilitation strategies where the mediator has little control over the process or substance of 
mediation. As Turkey was expected to play facilitator role by Israel, Turkey’s manipulative 
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strategy in the conflict by empowering Hamas to create more fair negotiation setting between 
the disputants, led Israel to see the mediator as dishonest. The reason of framing the mediator 
in that way lie in Israel’s perception of Turkish mediation leading to direct or indirect 
recognition of their adversaries’ claims. Arguably, it can be assumed that the stronger bias of 
the mediator towards the weak disputant would increase mediator’s credibility to convince the 
weak party to compromise. However, Turkey’s leverage is not capable enough on Hamas to 
deny terrorism and to recognize state of Israel. Turkey’s lack of leverage was experienced in 
the Hamas leader’s visit to Ankara in 2006 which doesn’t change the strict position of Hamas 
at all. Findings show that, partial mediator pursuing manipulative strategies would not be 
accepted by the relatively disfavored party, if the mediator has not sufficient resources and 
leverage on the relatively biased party.  
 Findings of the research are in alignment with what Princen (1992) states; while 
impartiality is appropriate for the weak mediator, bias is seen as acceptable, perhaps 
inevitable, for the powerful mediator208. In conjunction with Princen, I argue that the mediator 
who plays facilitator-communicator role needs to be perceived as impartial and needs to act in 
a way that is compatible with the interests of both disputants. In other words, if the mediator 
is expected to act as a facilitator, it should not follow manipulative strategies, otherwise 
would lead to dissatisfaction of the disputants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
208 Thomas Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1992, 18. 
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7.2.Israel- Syria Conflict  
 
Table 18. Integrated Findings in Israel- Syria Conflict 
  Pre-2009 Post-2009 
Economic Relations Positive Dependence 
with Israel 
Neutral 
Alliance Ties Positive Dependence 
with Israel 
Positive Dependence 
with Syria 
 
Relative Bias Turkey 
holds towards the 
disputants 
 Ethnic& Religious 
Ties 
Positive Dependence 
with Syria 
Positive Dependence 
with Syria 
 
 
Israel 
 
 
 
Defensive 
 
 
 
Defensive 
 
 
Motives of Turkey 
Perceived by the 
Disputants in 
Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict 
 
 
Syria 
 
Defensive 
 
 
Defensive 
 
 
Israel 
 
Satisfaction 
 
 
Dissatisfied: Unfair 
 
Palestine and 
Israel’s Perceptions 
of Mediation 
Outcomes 
 
 
Syria 
 
Satisfaction 
 
 
Satisfaction 
 
 
 Until the stage of the conflict pass to the destructive stage on December 2008, the 
findings of the Israeli- Syria conflict are in parallel with the conflict between Israel and 
Palestine. Likewise the first case, Turkey’s mediation has been perceived as successful by 
both adversaries due to its defensive motives and balanced bias towards the disputants. 
Maintaining its impartiality through the mediation process is both welcomed and Turkey’s 
culturally close relations with Syrians and its strategic and economic alliance with Israel had 
seen as an asset by both parties which enable Turkey to play facilitator role in the indirect 
negotiations in 2007.  
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 The course of mediation process, however, has changed after the Gaza attacks on 
December 2008. The conflict between Israel and Hamas had an indirect effect on the ongoing 
indirect negotiations between Syria and Israel. Even if the negotiations were suspended, there 
is a prospect in the near future to restart the indirect negotiations again. However, Turkey’s 
mediation initiatives in this process are not welcomed by the Israelis unlike to positive 
responses of Syria for Turkish mediation. The findings show that dissatisfaction of Israel and 
along with satisfaction of the Syria from the mediation process mainly originated from 
Turkey’s positive relative bias with the Syrians. On the other hand, as Israeli officials agree 
with the idea that Turkey has defensive motives, it doesn’t have any impact on the partial 
image of the Turkey for Israelis either in positive or negative way. In other words, based on 
the findings, the motives have less effect than the relative bias of the mediator for being seen 
as partial.   
 If the analysis of the cases is expanded by incorporating of the both tables, it could be 
argued that the changes in the variables of relative bias the mediator holds towards the 
disputants cause a shift in the disfavored party’s mediation outcome perception from 
successful to unfair and unsuccessful. Since the changes in the relative bias cause 
dissatisfaction for the relatively less biased disputant, it can be deduced that the definition of 
impartiality should be re-conceptualized by making the distinction between impartiality as 
attitude and impartiality as behavior. The distinction answer an important question that why 
Turkey is welcomed by Israel while it has already declared that it traditionally supports 
Palestinians and Syrians in Arab- Israel War, correspondingly why Turkey’s mediation is not 
desired by the Israelis after the war in Gaza on 2009. The answer lies in the fact that even if 
Turkey was partial in attitude before 2009, its impartial behaviors have enabled Turkey to 
play a mediator role. However, its partiality evokes and met with suspicion by Israelis when 
Turkey changes its strategic alliance in favor of Israel’s adversaries and act in close economic 
cooperation with the Syrians. In other words, when Turkey’s partiality turns into behavior, it 
has no longer been accepted as a fair mediator which eventually brings unsuccessful outcomes 
for the relatively less biased disputant’s point of view.   
 The analysis also shows that partial mediators are less likely to be perceived as 
successful by disfavored disputant as the degree of violence has intensified during the 
mediation process. In the research, as stage of the conflict passed to destructive phase in 
addition to Turkey’s pro-Palestinian and pro-Syrian stance in the escalation of the conflict, the 
relations with Israel and Turkey was deteriorated and entails the decrease in the mutual trust 
as well as construction of negative stereotypes and enemy perceptions. Based on the findings, 
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I argue that relatively negative biased disputant by the mediator in the mediation process is 
more susceptible and more likely to view the mediation process as unfair when the stage of 
the conflict passed to destructive phase. 
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       COCLUSIO 
 
 
 
  This study examines following research question: What is the influence of 
impartiality of the Turkey’s mediation efforts since 2002 in the conflicts of Israel-Syria and 
Israel-Palestine on the Turkey’s mediation outcomes perceived by Israel, Palestine and Syria.  
The research question focuses on a particular area of disagreement in the mediation literature 
which pertains to the role of impartiality in facilitator/communicator strategies.  
 The ongoing debate on the influence of the impartiality has divided into two tiers in 
the literature of international mediation. First tier scholars imply that impartiality is a 
necessary condition to be effective mediator (Young 1967, Haig 1984, Fisher 1995, Carnevale 
and Pruitt 1992). For them effective mediation could be achieved only through impartial 
mediator who has no preference as to how a dispute resolved. On the other hand, second tier 
scholars argue that (Carnevale and Arad 1996, Touval 1982) impartiality may diminish the 
credibility of the mediator since the disputants would not see their interests parallel with the 
mediator’s interests. According to this view, common interests among the disputant and the 
mediator will be helpful for the mediator to get concessions from a disputing party. If a 
mediator has close ties with one of the disputants, it is easier for such a mediator to convince 
the disputant on the fact that mediator’s proposal will serve their interest.  
 The findings of this research indicate that the ongoing discussion about the influence 
of the impartiality on the effective mediation outcome is not sufficient enough to capture all 
the aspects of the mediation process. Because in the literature, main shortcomings of the 
ongoing discussions stem from the fact that both scholars of pro- and against impartiality 
discuss the relationship between a mediator and disputants as if mediation is a dyadic process.  
If mediation process is analyzed as a triangular process, bias is an influential dimension to be 
accepted and welcomed as a mediator while, same bias at the same time may be regarded as a 
liability when the other disputant’s perceptions would be included. Therefore, based on the 
findings of the research, I argue that impartiality single-handedly is not solely enough to 
initiate a successful mediation, rather a mediator ought to have balanced bias with each 
disputant and motives of the mediator needs to be align with the preferences of the disputants. 
A mediator can utilize its partiality to every each disputant by establishing a balance in terms 
of relative bias it holds towards disputants. It would enable the mediator not only to have 
influence on the both disputants but also would be perceived as an impartial. The analysis also 
shows that partial mediators are less likely to be perceived as successful by disfavored 
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disputant as the degree of violence has intensified during the mediation process. Based on the 
findings, I argue that relatively negative biased disputant by the mediator in the mediation 
process is more susceptible and more likely to view the mediation process as unfair.   
 Second theoretical implication as this study demonstrated that the distinction between 
impartiality in behavior and attitude should be differentiated. Accordingly, the mediator who 
employs facilitator/ communicator strategies needs to be impartial in behavior in order to 
influence both disputants. Moreover, even if partiality in attitude is an asset for the mediator, 
when the behaviors of the mediator is determined by its partiality, the mediation would be 
rejected or framed as unfair by the disfavored disputant. In general, the theoretical 
implications discussed above emphasize on the importance of incorporating disputants’ view 
into account since mediation outcomes may be perceived and in return defined very 
differently by the parties involved.   
 Apart from theoretical implications, the research has also several policy implications 
relating to Turkey’s foreign policy towards Middle East and international mediation efforts as 
foreign policy tool. 
  Findings show that Turkey sometimes employs manipulative strategies which are not 
expected as a mediator by the disputants. As long as those strategies involve changing 
asymmetric power relations in the Middle East, its mediation is not accepted and appreciated 
by the Israel and Western powers. The role which is expected from Turkey is to ensure the 
continuation of conveying messages between the two sides, opening communication channels 
between the parties and providing safe space for track two exchanges. The manipulative 
strategies Turkey followed such as empowering Hamas against Israel, is beyond the Turkey’s 
level of leverage on the region which eventually creates an expectations-abilities gap209. 
Based on the research, I argue that Turkey needs to employ a mediator role which is 
compatible with the power dynamics of the region in order to achieve effective mediation 
outcomes. Otherwise, it would cause further polarization of regional politics, and a rift 
between Turkey and influential powers in the region such as Israel and Western powers.  
 Appropriate role of Turkey as a mediator is also related to Turkey’s motivations and 
expectations from the mediation process. As it is shown in the analysis of the findings, when 
Turkey had expansionist aims by implying either explicitly or implicitly the rhetoric of 
Turkey’s historical heritage on the Middle East, its mediation is not accepted by Israel and 
cause suspicion. Turkish policy makers need to publicize the mediation process to its 
                                                 
209 Altunışık, B. Meliha, 2008. “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle East,” Insight 
Turkey, Vol.10, No 2, 59. 
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constituents efficiently explaining the possible rewards would be achieved related to 
reputation, status and security matters during this process. However, high level officials of 
Turkey sometimes attempt to exploit its mediator role by directly involving to the conflicts as 
if Turkey is a primary party. Those policy attempts mainly stem from the fact that Turkish 
public opinion traditionally supports Palestinians and Syrians against Israel and therefore, 
Turkey’s expansionist motives by influencing Islamic parties in the region gains appreciation 
among AKP Governments’ constituents. Based on that, it can be deduced that a mediator who 
employ facilitator/ communicator strategies need to prevent from expansionist motivations in 
order to be seen as a fair mediator. Lastly, Turkey needs to be at least impartial in behavior, 
not necessarily in attitude, during the mediation process; otherwise its partial behaviors will 
jeopardize Turkey’s impartial image.         
 As this study focused on the facilitator/ communicator type of mediators, crucial 
avenue for future research is to assess the role of impartiality on the outcomes in the other 
types of mediators such as in the mediators who intends to employ manipulation or 
formulation strategies. The comparison of the influence of impartiality in different mediation 
techniques would enable the policy makers and scholars of the international mediation to have 
holistic approach on the impact of the impartiality on the outcome of the mediation process. 
In addition to that, another future research can be about examining the influence of 
impartiality on the successful outcomes by conducting multivariate data analysis method. 
Therefore, the relationship could be measured in the historical record of several international 
mediation efforts. This research will enable use to reach a generic knowledge on the role of 
impartiality in international mediation.    
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